SSL gesicherter Webserver mit mod_ssl für Apache httpd 2.4 unter CentOS 7.x
Dass das Internet systembedingt unsicher ist, hat sich in aller Regel herumgesprochen. Daten durchlaufen von der Quelle bis zum Ziel zahlreiche Server und Systeme, an denen die Daten, abgegriffen und/oder manipuliert werden können. Selbst in als vertrauenswürdig geltende Netze werden unter dem Vorwand von Sicherheit, verschlüsselte Verbindungen aufgebrochen und kompromitiert. Persönliche und vertrauliche Daten können so einfach Dritten in die Hände fallen, die mit grosser krimineller Energie versuchen an diese Daten zu kommen.
Inwieweit staatliche Stellen den Datenverkehr abhören, protokollieren und abgreifen und zu manipulieren bzw. zensieren versuchen, weiss
- keiner so genau und
- was mit den gewonnen Daten angestellt wird, wird sich niemand öffentlich sagen trauen.
Tja, das war Stand der Dinge vor 2013, denn was bisher in den Bereich der Spekulation fiel,
findet nun Bestätigung durch die Erkenntnisse des Whistleblowers Edward Snowden zu den Projekten PRISM aus den USA und TEMPORA aus England.
Seit Jahren werden unschuldige Bürgerinnen und Bürger von staatlichen Institutionen unter Generalverdacht gestellt und überwacht! Regierungen scheuen keinen Aufwand um in die Privatsphäre unschuldiger Bürgerinnen und Bürger einzudringen, Daten auszulesen und auszuwerten!
Was lernen wir aus dieser Tatsache? Unsere Kommunikation ist nach besten Wissen und Gewissen, so zu gestalten, damit andere unsere Daten nicht mitlesen und manipulieren können. Ferner ist sicherzustellen, dass Empfänger vertrauen können, dass Informationen tatsächlich von dem versandt wurden, von dem wir glauben, diese zu bekommen.
Nicht nur auf Seiten der Endkunden, die mit Hilfe von OpenPGP oder S/MIME vertraulich kommunizieren, sondern auch serverseitig kann der Übertragungsweg mit einfachen Mitteln entsprechend verschlüsselt werden. 
Für die vertrauliche Kommunikation zwischen unseren Usern und z.B. unserm Dovcot-Mailserver bietet sich eine verschlüsselte Kommunikation mit Hilfe von SSL/TLS an.
Mit Hilfe von PFS1) können wir leicht und einfach sicherstellen, dass aufgezeichnete Datenströme im nach hinein nicht entschlüsselt werden können. Dies wird erreicht, da die beiden Kommunikationspartner, einen separaten und individuellen temporären Schlüssel zur Datensicherung verwenden. Dieser Schlüssel ist dabei nicht fix, sondern wird bei jeder Verbindung neu ausgehandelt. Da aber der Schlüssel an sich nicht ausgetauscht werden muss, ist es auch nicht möglich, den eventuell aufgezeichneten Datenstrom zu entschlüsseln, da der dazu benötigte Schlüssel nicht im Datenstrom enthalten war.
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) basiert auf der Idee, dass Client und Server ihre Kommunikation über einen zusätzlichen temporären Schlüssel absichern, der wechselt. Da der Verbindungsaufbau so gestrickt ist, dass der Schlüssel selbst gar nicht ausgetauscht werden muss, kann der jeweils benutzte Sitzungsschlüssel selbst auch nicht aufgezeichnet werden. Eine nachträgliche Entschlüsselung einer früher aufgezeichneten Session ist damit nicht mehr möglich.
Die für die Verschlüsselung notwendigen Schlüssel und Zertifikate erstellen wir mittels OpenSSL, einer freien Implementierung von SSL2). SSL oder TLS3) ist ein hybrides Verschlüsselungsprotokoll zur Datenübertragung im Internet. Unter TLS 1.0, 1.1 und 1.2 versteht man die standardisierten Weiterentwicklungen von SSL 3.0 (TLS 1.0 steht neu für SSL 3.1). Dies bedeutet also, SSL wird nun unter dem Namen TLS weiterentwickelt.
Zur Absicherung unserer Privatsphäre bei unserem Webmailers setzen wir das Apache-Modul mod_ssl ein.
Nachfolgende Beschreibung zeigt, wie man unter CentOS 7 einen SSL geschützten virtuellen Host aufsetzen kann.
Installation
Zum Absichern des Verkehrs setzen wir auf das Paket mod_ssl.
OpenSSL
Bei der Standardinstallation unseres Systems wurde in der Regel bereits das Paket openssl installiert. Ein kurzer Blick in die RPMdatenbank schafft hierzu Gewissheit.
# yum list openssl
Installed Packages openssl.x86_64 1:1.0.1e-51.el7_2.7 @updates-LC
Sollte das Paket noch fehlen, installieren wir dies einfach via:
# yum install openssl
Was uns das Paket openssl alles mitbringt und wohin die Programme und Konfigurationsdateien kopiert werden, offenbart uns das System wie folgt.
# rpm -qil openssl
Name : openssl
Epoch : 1
Version : 1.0.1e
Release : 51.el7_2.7
Architecture: x86_64
Install Date: Wed 28 Sep 2016 07:57:19 PM CEST
Group : System Environment/Libraries
Size : 1611113
License : OpenSSL
Signature : RSA/SHA256, Tue 27 Sep 2016 04:21:24 PM CEST, Key ID 24c6a8a7f4a80eb5
Source RPM : openssl-1.0.1e-51.el7_2.7.src.rpm
Build Date : Tue 27 Sep 2016 03:41:26 PM CEST
Build Host : worker1.bsys.centos.org
Relocations : (not relocatable)
Packager : CentOS BuildSystem <http://bugs.centos.org>
Vendor : CentOS
URL : http://www.openssl.org/
Summary : Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Description :
The OpenSSL toolkit provides support for secure communications between
machines. OpenSSL includes a certificate management tool and shared
libraries which provide various cryptographic algorithms and
protocols.
/etc/pki/CA
/etc/pki/CA/certs
/etc/pki/CA/crl
/etc/pki/CA/newcerts
/etc/pki/CA/private
/etc/pki/tls/certs/Makefile
/etc/pki/tls/certs/make-dummy-cert
/etc/pki/tls/certs/renew-dummy-cert
/etc/pki/tls/misc/CA
/etc/pki/tls/misc/c_hash
/etc/pki/tls/misc/c_info
/etc/pki/tls/misc/c_issuer
/etc/pki/tls/misc/c_name
/usr/bin/openssl
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/CHANGES
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/FAQ
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/INSTALL
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/LICENSE
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/NEWS
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/README
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/README.FIPS
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/c-indentation.el
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl.txt
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl_button.gif
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl_button.html
/usr/share/doc/openssl-1.0.1e/ssleay.txt
/usr/share/man/man1/asn1parse.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/ca.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/ciphers.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/cms.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/crl.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/crl2pkcs7.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/dgst.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/dhparam.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/dsa.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/dsaparam.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/ec.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/ecparam.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/enc.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/errstr.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/gendsa.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/genpkey.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/genrsa.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/md2.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/md4.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/md5.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/mdc2.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/nseq.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/ocsp.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/openssl.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/pkcs12.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/pkcs7.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/pkcs8.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/pkey.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/pkeyparam.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/pkeyutl.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/req.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/ripemd160.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/rsa.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/rsautl.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/s_client.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/s_server.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/s_time.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/sess_id.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/sha.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/sha1.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/smime.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/speed.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/spkac.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/sslpasswd.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/sslrand.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/ts.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/tsget.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/verify.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/version.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man1/x509.1ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man5/config.5ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man5/openssl.cnf.5ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man5/x509v3_config.5ssl.gz
/usr/share/man/man7/des_modes.7ssl.gz
Cipher-Suites und Diffie-Hellman
Möchte man in Erfahrung bringen, welche Cipher-Suites4) unser installiertes OpenSSL-Paket mitbringt, können wir wie folgt abfragen5).
# openssl ciphers -v
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1 DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1 ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256 AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1 PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=PSK Au=PSK Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=SEED(128) Mac=SHA1 DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=SEED(128) Mac=SHA1 DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1 DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1 EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256 AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 SEED-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=SEED(128) Mac=SHA1 CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1 DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 IDEA-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=IDEA(128) Mac=SHA1 PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=PSK Au=PSK Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1 PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=PSK Au=PSK Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=KRB5 Au=KRB5 Enc=IDEA(128) Mac=SHA1 KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=KRB5 Au=KRB5 Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=KRB5 Au=KRB5 Enc=IDEA(128) Mac=MD5 KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=KRB5 Au=KRB5 Enc=3DES(168) Mac=MD5 ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=RC4(128) Mac=SHA1 ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=RC4(128) Mac=SHA1 ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/RSA Au=ECDH Enc=RC4(128) Mac=SHA1 ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA SSLv3 Kx=ECDH/ECDSA Au=ECDH Enc=RC4(128) Mac=SHA1 RC4-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=RC4(128) Mac=SHA1 RC4-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=RC4(128) Mac=MD5 PSK-RC4-SHA SSLv3 Kx=PSK Au=PSK Enc=RC4(128) Mac=SHA1 KRB5-RC4-SHA SSLv3 Kx=KRB5 Au=KRB5 Enc=RC4(128) Mac=SHA1 KRB5-RC4-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=KRB5 Au=KRB5 Enc=RC4(128) Mac=MD5
Wir haben also mit der aktuellen Version von OpenSSL, den für Perfect Forward Secrecy benötigten kryptographischen Algorithmus DH6) sowie den weiterentwickelten ECDH7).
mod_ssl
Die installation des Paketes mod_ssl erfolgt mit Hilfe des Befehls yum.
# yum install mod_ssl -y
Was uns das Paket mod_ssl alles mitbringt und wohin die Programme und Konfigurationsdateien kopiert werden, erkunden wir bei Bedarf mit nachfolgendem Aufruf.
# rpm -qil mod_ssl
Name : mod_ssl Epoch : 1 Version : 2.4.6 Release : 18.el7.centos Architecture: x86_64 Install Date: Fri 29 Aug 2014 09:07:58 PM CEST Group : System Environment/Daemons Size : 224652 License : ASL 2.0 Signature : RSA/SHA256, Wed 23 Jul 2014 05:21:47 PM CEST, Key ID 24c6a8a7f4a80eb5 Source RPM : httpd-2.4.6-18.el7.centos.src.rpm Build Date : Wed 23 Jul 2014 04:49:10 PM CEST Build Host : worker1.bsys.centos.org Relocations : (not relocatable) Packager : CentOS BuildSystem <http://bugs.centos.org> Vendor : CentOS URL : http://httpd.apache.org/ Summary : SSL/TLS module for the Apache HTTP Server Description : The mod_ssl module provides strong cryptography for the Apache Web server via the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/00-ssl.conf /usr/lib64/httpd/modules/mod_ssl.so /usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-pass-dialog /var/cache/httpd/ssl
Dokumentation
Fachliteratur
Das Buch Bulletproof SSL and TLS von Ivan Ristić bringt viele wertvoller Erklärungen und kann jedem interessierten Webmaster wärmstens empfohlen werden! Neben den Grundlagen zu SSL/TLS und PKI finden sich dort auch weiterführende Konfigurationsbeispiele unter anderem zu unserem Apache-Webserver 2.4. Ausserdem erhält man als registrierter Leser wertvolle aktualisierte News in Form von regelmässigen eMails, in denen aktuellste Entwicklungen und Schwachstellen beleuchtet werden.
Also alles in allem sehr gut angelegte 55€ - das Buch 978-1-907117-04-6 (ISBN) ist in jedem gut sortierten Buchhandel vor Ort erhältlich sein sollte.
Seiten im WWW
Natürlich finden sich im *WWW unzählige Seiten, die sich dem Thema TLS/SSL annehmen. Die Seiten bei zu Security/Server Side TLS im Mozilla WIKI sind neben dem Blog und dem Security Guidelines zur Web Security als sehr gute Quelle zu bewerten. Auch die Wikipedia Seite zu Transport Layer Security erklärt anschaulich das Thema Transportverschlüsselung.
man-Pages
openssl
# man openssl
OPENSSL(1) OpenSSL OPENSSL(1)
NAME
openssl - OpenSSL command line tool
SYNOPSIS
openssl command [ command_opts ] [ command_args ]
openssl [ list-standard-commands | list-message-digest-commands | list-cipher-commands
| list-cipher-algorithms | list-message-digest-algorithms | list-public-key-
algorithms]
openssl no-XXX [ arbitrary options ]
DESCRIPTION
OpenSSL is a cryptography toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) network protocols and related cryptography
standards required by them.
The openssl program is a command line tool for using the various cryptography
functions of OpenSSL's crypto library from the shell. It can be used for
o Creation and management of private keys, public keys and parameters
o Public key cryptographic operations
o Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
o Calculation of Message Digests
o Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers
o SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
o Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
o Time Stamp requests, generation and verification
COMMAND SUMMARY
The openssl program provides a rich variety of commands (command in the SYNOPSIS
above), each of which often has a wealth of options and arguments (command_opts and
command_args in the SYNOPSIS).
The pseudo-commands list-standard-commands, list-message-digest-commands, and list-
cipher-commands output a list (one entry per line) of the names of all standard
commands, message digest commands, or cipher commands, respectively, that are
available in the present openssl utility.
The pseudo-commands list-cipher-algorithms and list-message-digest-algorithms list all
cipher and message digest names, one entry per line. Aliases are listed as:
from => to
The pseudo-command list-public-key-algorithms lists all supported public key
algorithms.
The pseudo-command no-XXX tests whether a command of the specified name is available.
If no command named XXX exists, it returns 0 (success) and prints no-XXX; otherwise it
returns 1 and prints XXX. In both cases, the output goes to stdout and nothing is
printed to stderr. Additional command line arguments are always ignored. Since for
each cipher there is a command of the same name, this provides an easy way for shell
scripts to test for the availability of ciphers in the openssl program. (no-XXX is
not able to detect pseudo-commands such as quit, list-...-commands, or no-XXX itself.)
STANDARD COMMANDS
asn1parse Parse an ASN.1 sequence.
ca Certificate Authority (CA) Management.
ciphers Cipher Suite Description Determination.
cms CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) utility
crl Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Management.
crl2pkcs7 CRL to PKCS#7 Conversion.
dgst Message Digest Calculation.
dh Diffie-Hellman Parameter Management. Obsoleted by dhparam.
dhparam Generation and Management of Diffie-Hellman Parameters. Superseded by
genpkey and pkeyparam
dsa DSA Data Management.
dsaparam DSA Parameter Generation and Management. Superseded by genpkey and pkeyparam
ec EC (Elliptic curve) key processing
ecparam EC parameter manipulation and generation
enc Encoding with Ciphers.
engine Engine (loadble module) information and manipulation.
errstr Error Number to Error String Conversion.
gendh Generation of Diffie-Hellman Parameters. Obsoleted by dhparam.
gendsa Generation of DSA Private Key from Parameters. Superseded by genpkey and
pkey
genpkey Generation of Private Key or Parameters.
genrsa Generation of RSA Private Key. Superceded by genpkey.
nseq Create or examine a netscape certificate sequence
ocsp Online Certificate Status Protocol utility.
passwd Generation of hashed passwords.
pkcs12 PKCS#12 Data Management.
pkcs7 PKCS#7 Data Management.
pkey Public and private key management.
pkeyparam Public key algorithm parameter management.
pkeyutl Public key algorithm cryptographic operation utility.
rand Generate pseudo-random bytes.
req PKCS#10 X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Management.
rsa RSA key management.
rsautl RSA utility for signing, verification, encryption, and decryption.
Superseded by pkeyutl
s_client This implements a generic SSL/TLS client which can establish a transparent
connection to a remote server speaking SSL/TLS. It's intended for testing
purposes only and provides only rudimentary interface functionality but
internally uses mostly all functionality of the OpenSSL ssl library.
s_server This implements a generic SSL/TLS server which accepts connections from
remote clients speaking SSL/TLS. It's intended for testing purposes only and
provides only rudimentary interface functionality but internally uses mostly
all functionality of the OpenSSL ssl library. It provides both an own
command line oriented protocol for testing SSL functions and a simple HTTP
response facility to emulate an SSL/TLS-aware webserver.
s_time SSL Connection Timer.
sess_id SSL Session Data Management.
smime S/MIME mail processing.
speed Algorithm Speed Measurement.
spkac SPKAC printing and generating utility
ts Time Stamping Authority tool (client/server)
verify X.509 Certificate Verification.
version OpenSSL Version Information.
x509 X.509 Certificate Data Management.
MESSAGE DIGEST COMMANDS
md2 MD2 Digest
md5 MD5 Digest
mdc2 MDC2 Digest
rmd160 RMD-160 Digest
sha SHA Digest
sha1 SHA-1 Digest
sha224 SHA-224 Digest
sha256 SHA-256 Digest
sha384 SHA-384 Digest
sha512 SHA-512 Digest
ENCODING AND CIPHER COMMANDS
base64 Base64 Encoding
bf bf-cbc bf-cfb bf-ecb bf-ofb
Blowfish Cipher
cast cast-cbc
CAST Cipher
cast5-cbc cast5-cfb cast5-ecb cast5-ofb
CAST5 Cipher
des des-cbc des-cfb des-ecb des-ede des-ede-cbc des-ede-cfb des-ede-ofb des-ofb
DES Cipher
des3 desx des-ede3 des-ede3-cbc des-ede3-cfb des-ede3-ofb
Triple-DES Cipher
idea idea-cbc idea-cfb idea-ecb idea-ofb
IDEA Cipher
rc2 rc2-cbc rc2-cfb rc2-ecb rc2-ofb
RC2 Cipher
RC2 Cipher
rc4 RC4 Cipher
rc5 rc5-cbc rc5-cfb rc5-ecb rc5-ofb
RC5 Cipher
PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS
Several commands accept password arguments, typically using -passin and -passout for
input and output passwords respectively. These allow the password to be obtained from
a variety of sources. Both of these options take a single argument whose format is
described below. If no password argument is given and a password is required then the
user is prompted to enter one: this will typically be read from the current terminal
with echoing turned off.
pass:password
the actual password is password. Since the password is visible to utilities
(like 'ps' under Unix) this form should only be used where security is not
important.
env:var obtain the password from the environment variable var. Since the environment
of other processes is visible on certain platforms (e.g. ps under certain
Unix OSes) this option should be used with caution.
file:pathname
the first line of pathname is the password. If the same pathname argument is
supplied to -passin and -passout arguments then the first line will be used
for the input password and the next line for the output password. pathname
need not refer to a regular file: it could for example refer to a device or
named pipe.
fd:number read the password from the file descriptor number. This can be used to send
the data via a pipe for example.
stdin read the password from standard input.
SEE ALSO
asn1parse(1), ca(1), config(5), crl(1), crl2pkcs7(1), dgst(1), dhparam(1), dsa(1),
dsaparam(1), enc(1), gendsa(1), genpkey(1), genrsa(1), nseq(1), openssl(1),
sslpasswd(1), pkcs12(1), pkcs7(1), pkcs8(1), sslrand(1), req(1), rsa(1), rsautl(1),
s_client(1), s_server(1), s_time(1), smime(1), spkac(1), verify(1), version(1),
x509(1), crypto(3), ssl(3), x509v3_config(5)
HISTORY
The openssl(1) document appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.2. The list-XXX-commands pseudo-
commands were added in OpenSSL 0.9.3; The list-XXX-algorithms pseudo-commands were
added in OpenSSL 1.0.0; the no-XXX pseudo-commands were added in OpenSSL 0.9.5a. For
notes on the availability of other commands, see their individual manual pages.
1.0.1e 2016-09-27 OPENSSL(1)
dhparam
# man dhparam
DHPARAM(1) OpenSSL DHPARAM(1)
NAME
dhparam - DH parameter manipulation and generation
SYNOPSIS
openssl dhparam [-inform DER|PEM] [-outform DER|PEM] [-in filename] [-out filename]
[-dsaparam] [-noout] [-text] [-C] [-2] [-5] [-rand file(s)] [-engine id] [numbits]
DESCRIPTION
This command is used to manipulate DH parameter files.
OPTIONS
-inform DER|PEM
This specifies the input format. The DER option uses an ASN1 DER encoded form
compatible with the PKCS#3 DHparameter structure. The PEM form is the default
format: it consists of the DER format base64 encoded with additional header and
footer lines.
-outform DER|PEM
This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the -inform
option.
-in filename
This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if
this option is not specified.
-out filename
This specifies the output filename parameters to. Standard output is used if this
option is not present. The output filename should not be the same as the input
filename.
-dsaparam
If this option is used, DSA rather than DH parameters are read or created; they
are converted to DH format. Otherwise, "strong" primes (such that (p-1)/2 is also
prime) will be used for DH parameter generation.
DH parameter generation with the -dsaparam option is much faster, and the
recommended exponent length is shorter, which makes DH key exchange more
efficient. Beware that with such DSA-style DH parameters, a fresh DH key should
be created for each use to avoid small-subgroup attacks that may be possible
otherwise.
-2, -5
The generator to use, either 2 or 5. 2 is the default. If present then the input
file is ignored and parameters are generated instead.
-rand file(s)
a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator,
or an EGD socket (see RAND_egd(3)). Multiple files can be specified separated by
or an EGD socket (see RAND_egd(3)). Multiple files can be specified separated by
a OS-dependent character. The separator is ; for MS-Windows, , for OpenVMS, and :
for all others.
numbits
this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size numbits. It
must be the last option. If not present then a value of 512 is used. If this
option is present then the input file is ignored and parameters are generated
instead.
-noout
this option inhibits the output of the encoded version of the parameters.
-text
this option prints out the DH parameters in human readable form.
-C this option converts the parameters into C code. The parameters can then be loaded
by calling the get_dhnumbits() function.
-engine id
specifying an engine (by its unique id string) will cause dhparam to attempt to
obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if
needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.
WARNINGS
The program dhparam combines the functionality of the programs dh and gendh in
previous versions of OpenSSL and SSLeay. The dh and gendh programs are retained for
now but may have different purposes in future versions of OpenSSL.
NOTES
PEM format DH parameters use the header and footer lines:
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
OpenSSL currently only supports the older PKCS#3 DH, not the newer X9.42 DH.
This program manipulates DH parameters not keys.
BUGS
There should be a way to generate and manipulate DH keys.
SEE ALSO
dsaparam(1)
HISTORY
The dhparam command was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. The -dsaparam option was added in
OpenSSL 0.9.6.
1.0.1e 2013-02-11 DHPARAM(1)
Apache.org
Viele wervolle Hinweise zu den Konfigurationsparameter zu mod_ssl findet man in der Dokumentation zum Apache Module mod_ssl und SSL/TLS Strong Encryption How-To.
CA Trust
Dreh- und Angelpunkt bei den CAs und den zugehörigen Root-Zertifikaten ist das Vertrauen, welches man diesen schenken ma und/oder kann. Mit sehr hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit kann man davon ausgehen dass eine CA wie z.B. swiss sign die von den Browserherstellern geforderten Sicherheitsprüfungen erfüllen. Eine wesentliche Schwachstelle der ganzen CAs ist aber, wer garantiert, dass nicht eine x-beliebige zweite CA ein Zertifikat für z.B. nausch.org erstellt, obwohl bereits GlobalSign hierzu ein X.509-Zertifikat ausgestellt hat?
Ein Umstand, den sich z.B. alle Man-in-the-Middle-Angriffe zu nutze machen und unberechtigter Weise falsche Zertifikate ausstellen und somit dem sorglosen Endanwender in betrügerischer Art und Weise einen gefälschte Identität und eine nicht mehr existierende Ende zu Ende Verschlüsselung zwischen dem Webserver und Browser vorgaukeln.
Wir werden später noch Lösungen aufzeigen, wie wir zum einen auf Serverseite diese betrügerischen Angriffsversuche serverseitig soweit wie möglich zu unterbinden und auch auf Clientseite Lösungen aufzeigen, wie ein Kunde am Browser sehr leicht feststellen kann, ob die Verbindung sicher ist, oder ob jemand mit krimineller Energie versucht an vertrauliche Informationen durch einen MitM-Angriff zu kommen!
Zertifizierungspfad beim SSL Zertificate (trusted chain)
Bei der asymmetrischen Verschlüsselung, wie sie bei SSL/TLS gesicherter Kommunikation zum Einsatz kommt, benötigt der sendende Kommunikationspartner den öffentlichen Schlüssel (public key) des Empfängers. Bei dieser Kommunikation ist es äußerst wichtig, dass die Echtheit des Schlüssels gewährleistet, sprich auch überprüft werden kann. Diese Überprüfung erfolgt mit digitalen Zertifikaten, die die Echtheit eines öffentlichen Schlüssels sowie den Geltungsbereich und die Anwendungsbereich für das Zertifikat bestätigen.
Bei einer reinen 1:1 Kommunikation können sich beide Kommunikationspartner, oder der Client mit dem Server dieses Vertrauen selbst gegenseitig aussprechen. In den allermeisten Fällen wird es aber bei der verschlüsselten und vertraulichen Kommunikation um eine 1:n Kommunikation handeln; d.h. ein Server wird mit unter sehr vielen Clients Daten austauschen. Eine gegenseitige Vertrauensbildung ist hier in den allermeisten Fällen nicht realistisch und praktikabel durchführbar.
Für die Überprüfung der Echtheit der zur Verschlüsselung verwendeten X.509-Zertifikates wird wiederum ein digitales Zertifikat einer CA8) oder kurz Zertifizierungsstelle verwendet. Diese CA bestätigt somit die Echtheit des Zertifikates. Eine Zertifikat (Root Zertifikat) einer CA selbst kann wiederum durch eine weitere CA beglaubigt worden sein. Somit ergibt sich eine Kette von Zertifikaten, bei der jedes Zertifikat mit dem Zertifikat der übergeordneten Stelle authentifiziert werden kann. Diese Vertrauenskette wird auch Zertifizierungspfad oder trusted chain bezeichnet.
Die nachfolgende Graphik zeigt den Zertifizierungspfad eines Zertifikats mit dem CN9) dokuwiki.nausch.org.
Der Publickey in dem Zertifikat dokuwiki.nausch.org wurde mit dem Zertifikat CAcert Class 3 Root unterschrieben. Der Publickey dieses Root-Zertifikates CAcert Class 3 Root wurde wiederum mit dem Root-Zertifikat CA Cert Signing Authority unterschrieben.
Damit ein Client die Vertrauenskette (trusted chain) überprüfen kann, muss der Server diese beim TLS-Verbindungshandshake mit ausliefern! Normaler Weise wird die ausstellende CA von sich aus immer die benötigten Zwischen- und Root-Zertifikate der (Sub)CAs zur Verfügung stellen. Nutzt man einen sehr preisgünstigen Anbieter von Zertifikaten kann, die Suche nach den richtigen und passenden Zertifikaten zuweilen doch recht aufwändig werden.
Wir werden nun darauf eingehen, wie wir die trusted chain ermitteln, die Zertifikate besorgen und überprüfen können.
Im folgenden Beispiel orientieren wir uns am vorliegendem Zertifikat des Mailservers mx1.nausch.org. Das Zertifikat haben wir von der CA unseres Vertrauens erhalten.
- Als erstes ermitteln wir, wer genau unser Zertifikat unterschrieben hat.
# openssl x509 -subject -issuer -noout -in mx1.nausch.org.servercert.pem
subject= /serialNumber=3S7x2lcbYiAccKZPoha0MSwP5hNsuSTP/OU=GT49447951/OU=See www.rapidssl.com/resources/cps (c)13/OU=Domain Control Validated - RapidSSL(R)/CN=*.nausch.org issuer= /C=US/O=GeoTrust, Inc./CN=RapidSSL CA
Der CN bei der Zeile issuer beschreibt nun das Zertifikat, mit dem unser Serverzertifikat unterschrieben wurde.
- Von der Webseite der CA laden wir uns nun das betreffende Root-Zertifikat RapidSSL_CA.pem auf unseren Rechner.
- Auch bei diesem Root-Zertifikat RapidSSL_CA.pem ermitteln wir nun den issuer.
# openssl x509 -subject -issuer -noout -in RapidSSL_CA.pem
subject= /C=US/O=GeoTrust, Inc./CN=RapidSSL CA issuer= /C=US/O=GeoTrust Inc./CN=GeoTrust Global CA
Das Root Zertifikat der RapidSSL CA wurde also mit dem Root-Zertifikat der GeoTrust Global CA signiert.
- Wir benötigen also ein weiteres Root-Zertifikat. Von der Webseite der CA laden wir uns nun das betreffende Root-Zertifikat GeoTrust_Global_CA.pem auf unseren Rechner.
- Nun können wir ermitteln, wer dieses Zertifikat unterschrieben hat.
# openssl x509 -subject -issuer -noout -in GeoTrust_Global_CA.pem
subject= /C=US/O=GeoTrust Inc./CN=GeoTrust Global CA issuer= /C=US/O=Equifax/OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority
Das Root Zertifikat der GeoTrust Global CA wurde also mit dem Root-Zertifikat der Equifax Secure Certificate Authority unterschrieben.
- Wir werden uns also auch dieses Root-Zertifikat besorgen müssen. Erneiut gehen wir auf die Suche nach dem Root-Zertifikat und laden uns das betreffende Zertifikat Equifax_Secure_Certificate_Authority.pem auf unseren Rechner.
- Auch hier überprüfen wir nun, wer dieses Zertifikat nun unterschrieben hat.
# openssl x509 -subject -issuer -noout -in Equifax_Secure_Certificate_Authority.pem
subject= /C=US/O=Equifax/OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority issuer= /C=US/O=Equifax/OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority
Hier sehen wir nun, dass das subject und der issuer identisch sind, das Zertifikat wurde also selbst signiert (self signed certificate). Wir haben hier also das Wurzelzertifikat unserer Zertifizierungskette.
Somit ergibt sich für unser Zertifikat folgende komplette Zertifizierungskette.
── (1) Equifax Secure Certificate Authority │ └── (2) GeoTrust Global CA │ └── (3) RapidSSL CA │ └── (4) mx1.nausch.org.servercert.pemAus Interoperabilitätsgründen sollte vom Server immer die komplette Zertifikatskette zur Verfügung gestellt werden!
- Wir erstellen uns nun eine Datei in der die Root-Zertifikaten vom Serverzertifikat beginnend zum ersten Rootzertifikat beinhaltet, also in unserem Beispiel in der Reihenfolge (3) → (2) → (1).
# cat RapidSSL_CA.pem GeoTrust_Global_CA.pem Equifax_Secure_Certificate_Authority.pem > rapid_geotrust_equifax_bundle.pem
- Zum Schluss überprüfen wir noch ob nun alle benötigten Zertifikate in der richtigen Reihenfolge vorliegen.
# openssl verify -verbose -purpose sslserver -CAfile rapid_geotrust_equifax_bundle.pem mx1.nausch.org.servercert.pemmx01.nausch.org.servercert.pem: OK
Wir haben also bei diesem Konfigurationsbeispiel nun neben unserem Zertifikat mx1.nausch.org.servercert.pem die zugehörige Zertifikatskette rapid_geotrust_equifax_bundle.pem vorliegen!
Zertifikatserstellung
Technisch gesehen unterscheiden sich Zertifikate einer „offiziellen“ oder besser gesagt einer kommerziellen CA nicht von Zertifikaten einer eigenen „self signed“ Zertifikaten. In aller Regel wird dies abhängig davon sein, ob die verwendeten Zertifikate anstandslos von den Clientprogrammen (Mailclients und ggf. Browser) beim Endnutzer akzeptiert werden, also von einer vertrauenswürdigen CA stammen.
Egal welchen Weg wir hier gehen können oder müssen, zur Absicherung unserer Kommunikation benötigen wir drei Dinge:
- unseren Private Key, den wir hüten wie unseren Augapfel
- unseren Public Key mit zusätzlichen Daten , auch bekannt als CSR10), den wir von einer CA11) signieren lassen. Dies ist das Zertifikat, welches wir von unserer eigenen CA oder auch eine der vielen kommerziellen erhalten, und
- den Public Key der unterschreibenden CA, um deren Unterschrift zu prüfen, auch als Root-Zertifikat bekannt.
Nutzt man ein kommerzielle CA können wir die nächsten Kapitel 
getrost überspringen und gleich damit starten, den nötigen Schlüssel für unser Zertifikat/CSR zu erstellen.
Erstellen einer eigenen CA
Scriptgesteuert erstellen
Dem Paket openssl liegt zwar ein Bash-Script bei, mit dessen Hilfe die nachfolgenden Installationsschritte automatisiert ablaufen sollen, aber zum besseren Verständnis, gehen wir die Schritte kurz manuell durch. Das vorgenante Script aus dem Jahre '96 
findet man im Übrigen sonderbarer Weise unter /etc/pki/tls/misc/CA.
# cat /etc/pki/tls/misc/CA
- /etc/pki/tls/misc/CA
#!/bin/sh # # CA - wrapper around ca to make it easier to use ... basically ca requires # some setup stuff to be done before you can use it and this makes # things easier between now and when Eric is convinced to fix it :-) # # CA -newca ... will setup the right stuff # CA -newreq ... will generate a certificate request # CA -sign ... will sign the generated request and output # # At the end of that grab newreq.pem and newcert.pem (one has the key # and the other the certificate) and cat them together and that is what # you want/need ... I'll make even this a little cleaner later. # # # 12-Jan-96 tjh Added more things ... including CA -signcert which # converts a certificate to a request and then signs it. # 10-Jan-96 eay Fixed a few more bugs and added the SSLEAY_CONFIG # environment variable so this can be driven from # a script. # 25-Jul-96 eay Cleaned up filenames some more. # 11-Jun-96 eay Fixed a few filename missmatches. # 03-May-96 eay Modified to use 'ssleay cmd' instead of 'cmd'. # 18-Apr-96 tjh Original hacking # # Tim Hudson # tjh@cryptsoft.com # # default openssl.cnf file has setup as per the following # demoCA ... where everything is stored cp_pem() { infile=$1 outfile=$2 bound=$3 flag=0 exec <$infile; while read line; do if [ $flag -eq 1 ]; then echo $line|grep "^-----END.*$bound" 2>/dev/null 1>/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then echo $line >>$outfile break else echo $line >>$outfile fi fi echo $line|grep "^-----BEGIN.*$bound" 2>/dev/null 1>/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo $line >$outfile flag=1 fi done } usage() { echo "usage: $0 -newcert|-newreq|-newreq-nodes|-newca|-sign|-verify" >&2 } if [ -z "$OPENSSL" ]; then OPENSSL=openssl; fi if [ -z "$DAYS" ] ; then DAYS="-days 365" ; fi # 1 year CADAYS="-days 1095" # 3 years REQ="$OPENSSL req $SSLEAY_CONFIG" CA="$OPENSSL ca $SSLEAY_CONFIG" VERIFY="$OPENSSL verify" X509="$OPENSSL x509" PKCS12="openssl pkcs12" if [ -z "$CATOP" ] ; then CATOP=/etc/pki/CA ; fi CAKEY=./cakey.pem CAREQ=./careq.pem CACERT=./cacert.pem RET=0 while [ "$1" != "" ] ; do case $1 in -\?|-h|-help) usage exit 0 ;; -newcert) # create a certificate $REQ -new -x509 -keyout newkey.pem -out newcert.pem $DAYS RET=$? echo "Certificate is in newcert.pem, private key is in newkey.pem" ;; -newreq) # create a certificate request $REQ -new -keyout newkey.pem -out newreq.pem $DAYS RET=$? echo "Request is in newreq.pem, private key is in newkey.pem" ;; -newreq-nodes) # create a certificate request $REQ -new -nodes -keyout newreq.pem -out newreq.pem $DAYS RET=$? echo "Request (and private key) is in newreq.pem" ;; -newca) # if explicitly asked for or it doesn't exist then setup the directory # structure that Eric likes to manage things NEW="1" if [ "$NEW" -o ! -f ${CATOP}/serial ]; then # create the directory hierarchy mkdir -p ${CATOP} mkdir -p ${CATOP}/certs mkdir -p ${CATOP}/crl mkdir -p ${CATOP}/newcerts mkdir -p ${CATOP}/private touch ${CATOP}/index.txt fi if [ ! -f ${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY ]; then echo "CA certificate filename (or enter to create)" read FILE # ask user for existing CA certificate if [ "$FILE" ]; then cp_pem $FILE ${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY PRIVATE cp_pem $FILE ${CATOP}/$CACERT CERTIFICATE RET=$? if [ ! -f "${CATOP}/serial" ]; then $X509 -in ${CATOP}/$CACERT -noout -next_serial \ -out ${CATOP}/serial fi else echo "Making CA certificate ..." $REQ -new -keyout ${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY \ -out ${CATOP}/$CAREQ $CA -create_serial -out ${CATOP}/$CACERT $CADAYS -batch \ -keyfile ${CATOP}/private/$CAKEY -selfsign \ -extensions v3_ca \ -infiles ${CATOP}/$CAREQ RET=$? fi fi ;; -xsign) $CA -policy policy_anything -infiles newreq.pem RET=$? ;; -pkcs12) if [ -z "$2" ] ; then CNAME="My Certificate" else CNAME="$2" fi $PKCS12 -in newcert.pem -inkey newreq.pem -certfile ${CATOP}/$CACERT \ -out newcert.p12 -export -name "$CNAME" RET=$? exit $RET ;; -sign|-signreq) $CA -policy policy_anything -out newcert.pem -infiles newreq.pem RET=$? cat newcert.pem echo "Signed certificate is in newcert.pem" ;; -signCA) $CA -policy policy_anything -out newcert.pem -extensions v3_ca -infiles newreq.pem RET=$? echo "Signed CA certificate is in newcert.pem" ;; -signcert) echo "Cert passphrase will be requested twice - bug?" $X509 -x509toreq -in newreq.pem -signkey newreq.pem -out tmp.pem $CA -policy policy_anything -out newcert.pem -infiles tmp.pem RET=$? cat newcert.pem echo "Signed certificate is in newcert.pem" ;; -verify) shift if [ -z "$1" ]; then $VERIFY -CAfile $CATOP/$CACERT newcert.pem RET=$? else for j do $VERIFY -CAfile $CATOP/$CACERT $j if [ $? != 0 ]; then RET=$? fi done fi exit $RET ;; *) echo "Unknown arg $i" >&2 usage exit 1 ;; esac shift done exit $RET
Wichtig:
Zum besseren Verständnis der Zertifikatsthematik, gehen wir die Schritte kurz manuell durch und nutzen nicht das fast 20 jahre alte Script.
manuelle Erstellung unserer eigenen CA
fehlende Dateien anlegen
Als erstes legen wir die noch fehlenden Dateien an.
# echo "00" > /etc/pki/CA/serial
# touch /etc/pki/CA/index.txt
Somit befindet sich in unserem Pfad /etc/pki/CA nun folgender Inhalt:
# ll /etc/pki/CA
total 4 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 6 Jun 24 14:57 certs drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 6 Jun 24 14:57 crl -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Jul 23 14:03 index.txt drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 6 Jun 24 14:57 newcerts drwx------ 2 root root 6 Jun 24 14:57 private -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3 Jul 23 14:03 serial
CA-Erstellung mit Hilfe von openssl
Die Gültigkeit setzen wir mit 25 Jahren bewusst sehr hoch an. Nach dem Ablauf der Gültigkeit der CA werden nämlich auch alle damit signierten Serverzertifikate ungültig! Bei der nun folgenden Generierung unserer CA wird automatisch ein Schlüssel (private key), mit einer Länge von 2048 Bit, erzeugt und in der Datei cakey.pem abgespeichert. Das CA-Zertifikat selbst wird nach cacert.pem geschrieben.
Zur Sicherheit schützen wir den private key unserer CA mit einer Passphrase! Denn wer den geheimen Schlüssel der CA hat/kennt, könnte damit beliebige Serverzertifikate signieren. Daher legen wir dieses Keyfile nicht im Klartext auf der Festplatte ab, sondern mit einer Passphrase verschlüsselt. Diese Passphrase benötigen wir immer dann, wenn wir mit unser eigenen CA neue Zertifikate ausstellen wollen. Im nachfolgenden Dialog akzetieren wir die Vorgaben in eckigen Klammern, geben unsere individuellen Daten an, oder quittieren ein leeres Feld mittels eines Punktes .. Beim Feld Common Name (CN) geben wir den Domain-Namen unserer Zertifizierungsstelle ein.
Diese Daten werden dem Client angezeigt, sobald dieser aufgefordert wird, das Zertifikat zu akzeptieren oder abzulehnen.
Die Eingaben sind in der Farbe blau und die Rückmeldungen in der Farbe schwarz gekennzeichnet.
# openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout cakey.pem -out cacert.pem -days 9125
Generating a 4096 bit RSA private key ..................................................++ ....................++ writing new private key to 'cakey.pem' Enter PEM pass phrase: des-woas-blos-I-und-sundst-koana Verifying - Enter PEM pass phrase: des-woas-blos-I-und-sundst-koana ----- You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated into your certificate request. What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN. There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank For some fields there will be a default value, If you enter '.', the field will be left blank. ----- Country Name (2 letter code) [XX]:DE State or Province Name (full name) []:Bayern Locality Name (eg, city) [Default City]:Pliening Organization Name (eg, company) [Default Company Ltd]:nausch.org Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:Zertifizierungsstelle Common Name (eg, your name or your server's hostname) []:nausch.org Email Address []:ca-support@nausch.org
Als Ergebnis erhalten wir zwei Dateien:
- cakey.pem den private key unserer CA und
- cacert.pem das CA-Certifikat unserer CA.
# ll *.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2171 Aug 29 21:46 cacert.pem -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3406 Aug 29 21:46 cakey.pem
Sichtshalber ändern wir die Rechte so, dass die Schlüsseldateien nur für root lesbar sind:
# chmod 400 *.pem
Bei Bedarf kann man mit openssl rsa -in <keyfile> -noout -text die Schlüsseldatei öffnen und ausgeben lassen.
# openssl rsa -in cakey.pem -noout -text
Enter pass phrase for cakey.pem: des-woas-blos-I-und-sundst-koana
Private-Key: (4096 bit)
modulus:
00:a6:c0:e4:4a:c5:be:6c:c7:fe:8d:20:34:3d:58:
f5:40:3c:4b:b6:8a:df:3f:2b:cf:c2:9a:d6:0e:1e:
78:25:93:b1:6e:d4:fe:c4:41:0a:3a:f4:7e:f9:f1:
f1:a3:2a:b9:c2:b7:86:39:94:4a:16:be:97:e6:92:
4a:3d:e7:f3:63:46:d4:fb:66:b1:cb:f6:d0:0a:9e:
04:fd:cc:d0:7f:bd:af:40:01:cb:86:ab:c7:e8:25:
d8:58:72:66:a7:6e:ab:af:70:a6:07:06:df:a8:86:
d9:53:75:74:d5:55:a7:4c:7e:4a:55:96:39:0a:97:
98:eb:b3:58:57:bc:5d:ef:7b:6c:8c:a0:ba:9f:10:
67:14:f0:4f:2b:7b:b9:72:b9:ff:e2:99:3f:a7:d2:
91:2c:a2:db:94:e9:bb:90:06:e2:91:06:c7:26:fb:
23:06:83:b0:60:30:a2:d5:7d:22:95:62:99:42:c3:
8e:58:44:32:52:29:ad:68:27:bb:ae:5d:99:67:0e:
10:a0:3c:c0:a6:d4:d5:44:a8:c9:c4:a4:45:12:19:
46:c3:aa:dc:e5:61:a2:0c:cf:2f:38:f3:6f:5c:13:
f9:fe:86:c0:4a:ba:2a:9a:4f:25:4d:63:85:e4:6a:
9d:f1:53:a0:31:64:aa:77:98:b9:0e:63:5c:de:d9:
04:ed:d0:b7:fa:5b:5d:cc:e4:1e:c4:5b:e3:05:dd:
79:21:ae:e1:a3:6d:0b:9e:78:fb:d7:67:cc:a4:b2:
21:44:e1:0a:bc:e1:e9:ab:1d:f2:c8:a9:59:51:3c:
dd:d9:e4:de:e5:a3:c7:95:83:5a:f5:c1:b1:cb:69:
f5:fe:a6:8d:91:11:c4:5d:cd:b5:cc:fc:77:60:68:
aa:3e:92:dc:6f:ac:55:03:82:7a:7d:77:17:00:14:
4f:e2:b9:d8:87:bc:30:f1:b7:28:1d:a9:6b:25:2c:
22:28:29:6b:9e:ba:ad:2f:12:77:be:e4:43:69:0f:
fd:a7:f9:03:21:05:df:f4:eb:90:1c:8e:1e:82:d2:
81:0d:a1:a9:00:cb:3e:b8:73:39:19:4f:32:cc:dc:
4e:ea:ab:1c:1b:a1:6d:63:68:a8:3a:67:65:22:ec:
0c:ea:f7:e6:38:9c:5e:0c:8c:e7:d1:30:fa:53:2d:
80:2f:19:84:d2:49:17:7f:6d:d5:63:d2:20:3d:ec:
e6:d7:74:65:e6:cc:be:cb:1b:07:76:96:aa:05:16:
4e:26:89:ab:42:f1:39:58:2c:af:44:fb:e6:c9:ea:
46:34:19:8f:6a:d4:59:55:d8:40:d5:a2:39:8e:80:
ce:9b:6e:42:8f:2f:49:93:24:b5:6c:a5:07:b0:9c:
f9:25:eb
publicExponent: 65537 (0x10001)
privateExponent:
45:42:50:8f:8d:da:2d:ac:53:59:a2:4a:90:40:66:
7c:ab:8e:76:de:ef:22:79:bb:ed:04:0a:6c:0a:d3:
b4:27:c7:c6:54:c9:0c:12:47:81:7d:13:50:14:e1:
5b:f7:de:f7:b4:ea:16:f8:34:5d:86:03:e9:4c:51:
71:ac:e9:36:0e:b1:5f:49:a4:07:27:17:f9:90:f0:
59:c9:bb:bf:92:b5:3b:4c:83:90:07:c1:1b:f6:bc:
08:e0:5b:2a:a7:98:bf:61:76:53:ec:d2:f0:58:31:
e3:ac:21:3e:8a:38:d6:58:8d:df:46:69:a2:b0:9c:
5f:29:3a:44:16:84:9d:77:11:fa:c6:b7:3c:61:bf:
ae:be:b0:e3:4a:9c:17:be:91:3d:38:91:6b:ce:d5:
65:48:af:13:06:91:54:9c:c7:75:9c:ef:12:8d:b4:
5a:7c:4f:c1:63:f1:fd:e1:df:7f:54:58:7b:96:65:
84:db:ae:5a:d9:dc:a0:2a:00:95:c7:62:73:9f:2f:
e0:9d:db:16:6f:c7:b4:a0:b6:4c:ea:3d:95:ea:d1:
ad:6b:46:1c:2f:94:f2:e5:0a:a4:08:d7:f3:d2:88:
3e:e3:10:f2:f8:a7:c1:37:a6:32:a2:67:76:1b:a2:
46:1d:89:a7:7a:3c:23:38:57:84:56:58:b8:66:42:
d9:27:95:61:cb:1b:39:61:a4:f1:cb:c1:71:ea:3f:
3b:a3:44:ea:84:77:eb:f6:bb:3e:9e:08:1d:27:91:
b5:89:cd:ba:97:fc:6a:de:f9:43:9d:e4:a0:b2:b5:
bd:b7:ea:d7:84:2e:9e:78:5b:fc:27:73:6c:51:40:
c0:bd:0c:69:3e:4a:c5:ac:15:cb:a8:7c:4a:fa:ee:
bc:64:94:02:af:da:56:e5:56:9f:79:93:8d:f1:42:
f7:39:99:dc:82:ab:4b:20:e9:10:da:01:2c:94:be:
fa:d6:9d:59:e9:fb:b9:b8:af:79:10:25:f9:a4:22:
1e:4b:03:ac:e7:a1:57:35:d8:e4:49:1b:78:c5:b9:
1c:3f:30:1c:19:20:2a:b9:0f:90:aa:c1:60:19:ba:
b5:de:98:c4:68:81:ef:8a:c7:fc:c7:64:85:3a:47:
a7:97:b7:ec:4d:fe:f9:ce:e9:9a:2f:76:ea:77:0e:
3e:ac:48:f9:f2:c4:c0:fa:af:f7:09:a6:cb:35:14:
c6:30:fe:ba:7d:b2:d9:ba:50:9a:84:5c:17:11:65:
c4:b9:86:c7:db:52:05:b6:66:df:05:e9:17:03:c1:
02:5b:77:06:0b:7f:5a:a9:f9:01:b7:8d:4a:c3:42:
d7:cd:80:f3:12:c1:36:e2:bf:08:36:52:d8:c6:79:
6d:a1
prime1:
00:dd:13:5d:14:12:93:0e:aa:0b:5f:b2:a7:a8:10:
5b:0c:cc:41:46:bb:ac:3a:d1:e1:e8:76:4b:1a:49:
0e:d4:0c:5e:51:75:c4:77:f5:68:dd:26:f2:d1:b6:
02:77:e2:cf:53:37:a6:f4:a5:b3:dc:26:56:bd:8f:
3e:b2:22:67:67:dc:a1:70:40:6b:57:33:b4:08:e6:
d0:f3:a4:dd:b3:0c:17:bc:57:2a:47:9a:fc:c8:0d:
03:41:b7:56:d6:ce:69:bf:7a:45:5a:72:6c:02:b3:
70:a7:fa:62:ac:a4:5d:5a:c6:92:5d:84:f4:8f:90:
3a:d2:4a:79:89:d7:6a:50:41:12:ea:b9:24:e0:96:
e5:70:62:0a:50:3e:82:cf:56:08:99:47:ba:bf:7b:
8f:b7:b0:89:b6:06:ea:0e:78:86:5b:e1:32:2f:49:
61:88:62:29:c3:db:c0:a1:89:1a:66:48:c4:c1:07:
12:11:2a:ad:73:0a:c2:f3:fa:75:66:88:87:c0:66:
cc:70:7c:29:96:e1:4b:36:36:7e:73:4c:ba:65:5b:
c6:07:c1:e1:d0:43:e6:c8:6e:83:ed:67:c2:ce:b4:
2c:a9:e2:5c:87:24:bb:ad:f0:3c:d7:7a:c7:86:aa:
d3:e3:f1:24:12:8b:b1:55:3e:a7:77:65:80:75:fe:
b6:37
prime2:
00:c1:18:a8:42:3e:47:be:ac:a1:5a:82:06:24:ff:
15:d6:07:dc:79:94:25:6a:f9:de:63:18:d9:93:ca:
d8:88:94:8a:d3:7f:f3:2e:6f:1c:64:40:86:e7:3d:
34:8e:45:c9:f4:dd:1a:17:bb:7f:55:9d:ed:d6:d3:
73:7e:c5:9d:a8:0f:cd:00:eb:78:9c:0c:4d:77:b5:
f7:80:e4:5c:ee:84:1b:aa:9f:b9:82:24:b3:e9:cd:
7e:ee:bb:bf:ce:a0:82:cf:cc:fa:2c:b8:07:fe:79:
ab:00:41:6a:55:3b:88:6e:5c:53:64:07:c2:2a:78:
29:a6:c2:5c:5d:77:1d:a1:83:d5:d1:4b:3d:ce:88:
e4:6f:e8:ff:0b:cb:9e:79:51:63:00:02:5e:2f:fc:
2d:14:9d:02:e0:eb:88:8b:35:76:94:a9:da:da:a9:
b6:5b:eb:b2:ff:ad:72:a6:4e:6a:1d:08:36:99:fc:
63:8b:92:66:c9:0b:af:6d:64:f0:d0:0e:8b:10:2c:
45:7f:2e:e3:6d:7d:e0:60:69:65:30:0e:25:5b:d8:
06:00:77:cb:1e:d5:9b:72:34:49:e8:9c:c6:a8:61:
2d:e0:f8:fe:c7:57:ae:47:79:14:07:22:38:9e:bf:
44:ec:28:b5:73:73:a4:c1:26:89:b0:71:ee:4e:4e:
b3:ed
exponent1:
69:79:e7:9a:c0:11:f1:99:27:bc:0c:dc:f8:ce:74:
e2:72:41:62:a1:ff:d6:40:74:ec:18:24:54:f2:2e:
64:f5:51:ba:c3:d9:6c:f2:65:89:be:1f:73:f6:c6:
ce:b4:23:fe:ac:3a:b7:d6:a7:2d:8e:0d:2c:7b:bf:
89:f5:e8:28:21:97:d4:9a:a7:9b:ff:4b:12:44:2d:
c5:51:0f:85:71:6b:91:ac:74:bb:9d:32:a5:af:af:
b2:16:eb:13:a9:7f:c2:9f:6f:9f:6b:a0:24:d9:c0:
12:24:e0:17:46:84:53:df:11:ce:14:b5:2a:19:c2:
36:ba:d9:a9:ee:61:06:d1:45:59:3f:e4:5c:53:22:
3c:b0:4a:03:67:0f:ba:24:6e:0d:d3:af:41:d4:8e:
09:31:ed:42:2f:a2:54:2d:24:cd:89:70:0c:27:92:
a5:23:50:91:e5:b2:ce:5f:3f:7d:35:92:ca:15:b9:
84:ff:3b:a9:fb:a4:70:0b:3b:20:24:5b:c0:6c:4b:
76:0f:87:38:39:5d:4d:0c:4a:e0:6f:e7:2e:9c:ce:
aa:bc:d2:24:2f:81:58:77:81:f2:2e:e3:3f:03:af:
9b:8e:28:5f:42:23:59:25:99:a1:a5:2e:b5:0d:a3:
f2:c9:06:50:e2:dd:44:b2:93:eb:df:3d:9f:0e:5b:
99
exponent2:
0f:3d:16:ea:43:67:fe:10:39:9b:9e:ef:45:34:2c:
50:fb:c5:d6:82:6e:81:86:be:9a:2b:77:e0:45:fd:
d8:a9:80:5b:38:99:c4:6c:58:5d:41:0a:64:6d:5c:
1c:6e:3d:85:e9:7d:09:aa:6e:5e:1f:5c:89:bb:9e:
3d:be:f2:b6:34:a9:05:0d:90:33:20:75:6c:a1:1b:
ab:3c:5a:69:28:5b:d6:97:4c:58:8c:f4:f5:da:95:
cd:d9:5b:45:bf:3d:13:91:25:9d:29:d8:d7:a8:5a:
6a:66:bf:31:82:c5:3d:90:63:b4:5d:38:61:89:a2:
1f:da:ee:d7:21:73:61:2f:ba:4c:0e:18:0e:98:97:
0e:8d:e0:b2:d9:9a:e4:10:1c:33:ff:fb:d6:e5:9b:
d9:28:9a:f5:8d:20:f5:7b:7e:a4:34:d3:64:b6:48:
01:f1:13:eb:41:90:ee:b6:f9:80:d9:09:16:15:e8:
f5:36:d4:8d:c1:32:52:fb:c8:55:63:10:6e:72:4f:
f9:bd:85:8d:3a:85:de:95:f2:ba:5c:23:6e:a0:19:
b9:27:bb:0b:ef:e7:98:97:af:cd:7f:b1:dd:cf:ed:
82:f7:a3:83:af:d3:bd:28:3d:00:63:1e:fc:c8:33:
74:3f:b2:32:2e:4a:2e:44:10:51:b0:6c:12:19:fb:
f1
coefficient:
00:a6:96:2f:62:1b:35:35:c6:20:ef:a9:8e:66:ac:
5b:2c:a4:cc:ff:ed:a6:53:ad:9d:e1:cb:73:4e:3c:
df:08:f8:7a:10:ee:f1:3b:51:52:6a:ba:eb:60:3a:
72:ee:89:d5:ce:f3:64:bb:44:97:0a:94:25:7f:ce:
0e:f5:13:33:1e:2c:ba:7e:7e:ec:39:4a:ea:8c:05:
76:48:59:f2:19:e5:16:37:1f:1d:dc:9e:06:cb:20:
31:9c:00:61:40:ba:8b:94:c2:68:2c:54:04:a4:5b:
36:d5:36:dd:cc:64:d8:15:d1:14:0e:de:23:9a:59:
c3:b3:1d:7c:6d:29:98:6d:b3:11:71:d1:6e:d2:9d:
01:9a:12:aa:f9:1f:54:f1:d6:0a:b3:ea:1c:b4:cb:
fb:91:f3:dd:e4:a7:3c:f0:74:f1:c9:e5:42:f2:2d:
03:b6:a4:ba:34:92:f5:70:f0:ae:34:b3:6f:c4:69:
3d:14:76:ec:a6:e6:c6:d2:a4:d3:05:30:0e:f8:de:
46:f1:f6:bc:4d:ba:7c:fe:fa:5d:fa:35:54:df:be:
b5:08:92:ea:ba:b6:9c:cc:06:77:40:1e:c3:cc:f7:
6a:4f:56:a7:b3:a9:9a:55:91:55:e0:aa:8e:f7:8d:
6e:59:26:d7:8e:ea:c8:e1:19:a9:12:c0:43:f7:7d:
82:f5
Will man die Passphrase eines Schlüssels entfernen, geht man wie folgt vor:
# openssl rsa <cakey.pem >cakey_ohne_passphrase.pem
Enter pass phrase: des-woas-blos-I-und-sundst-koana writing RSA key
Auch hier sind die Eingaben sind in der Farbe blau, sowie die Rückmeldungen in der Farbe schwarz gekennzeichnet.
Den Schlüssel unserer eigenen CA verschieben wir nun an die richtige Stelle.
# mv cakey.pem /etc/pki/CA/private/cakey.pem
Das Gleiche machen wir mit dem eigenen Root-Zertifikat.
# mv cacert.pem /etc/pki/CA/cacert.pem
Laufzeit der Zertifikate anpassen
Da wir die Laufzeit der erzeugten Zertifikate nicht auf der Kommandozeile beim Aufruf von openssl angeben können, passen wir in der OpenSSL-Konfigurationsdatei die Laufzeit default_days an.
# vim /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
- /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
# # OpenSSL example configuration file. # This is mostly being used for generation of certificate requests. # # This definition stops the following lines choking if HOME isn't # defined. HOME = . RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd # Extra OBJECT IDENTIFIER info: #oid_file = $ENV::HOME/.oid oid_section = new_oids # To use this configuration file with the "-extfile" option of the # "openssl x509" utility, name here the section containing the # X.509v3 extensions to use: # extensions = # (Alternatively, use a configuration file that has only # X.509v3 extensions in its main [= default] section.) [ new_oids ] # We can add new OIDs in here for use by 'ca', 'req' and 'ts'. # Add a simple OID like this: # testoid1=1.2.3.4 # Or use config file substitution like this: # testoid2=${testoid1}.5.6 # Policies used by the TSA examples. tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1 tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6 tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7 #################################################################### [ ca ] default_ca = CA_default # The default ca section #################################################################### [ CA_default ] dir = /etc/pki/CA # Where everything is kept certs = $dir/certs # Where the issued certs are kept crl_dir = $dir/crl # Where the issued crl are kept database = $dir/index.txt # database index file. #unique_subject = no # Set to 'no' to allow creation of # several ctificates with same subject. new_certs_dir = $dir/newcerts # default place for new certs. certificate = $dir/cacert.pem # The CA certificate serial = $dir/serial # The current serial number crlnumber = $dir/crlnumber # the current crl number # must be commented out to leave a V1 CRL crl = $dir/crl.pem # The current CRL private_key = $dir/private/cakey.pem# The private key RANDFILE = $dir/private/.rand # private random number file x509_extensions = usr_cert # The extentions to add to the cert # Comment out the following two lines for the "traditional" # (and highly broken) format. name_opt = ca_default # Subject Name options cert_opt = ca_default # Certificate field options # Extension copying option: use with caution. # copy_extensions = copy # Extensions to add to a CRL. Note: Netscape communicator chokes on V2 CRLs # so this is commented out by default to leave a V1 CRL. # crlnumber must also be commented out to leave a V1 CRL. # crl_extensions = crl_ext # Django : 2014-07-23 # default: default_days = 365 # how long to certify for (one year) default_days = 730 # how long to certify for (two years) default_crl_days= 30 # how long before next CRL default_md = sha256 # use SHA-256 by default preserve = no # keep passed DN ordering # A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look # For type CA, the listed attributes must be the same, and the optional # and supplied fields are just that :-) policy = policy_match # For the CA policy [ policy_match ] countryName = match stateOrProvinceName = match organizationName = match organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional # For the 'anything' policy # At this point in time, you must list all acceptable 'object' # types. [ policy_anything ] countryName = optional stateOrProvinceName = optional localityName = optional organizationName = optional organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional #################################################################### [ req ] default_bits = 2048 default_md = sha256 default_keyfile = privkey.pem distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name attributes = req_attributes x509_extensions = v3_ca # The extentions to add to the self signed cert # Passwords for private keys if not present they will be prompted for # input_password = secret # output_password = secret # This sets a mask for permitted string types. There are several options. # default: PrintableString, T61String, BMPString. # pkix : PrintableString, BMPString (PKIX recommendation before 2004) # utf8only: only UTF8Strings (PKIX recommendation after 2004). # nombstr : PrintableString, T61String (no BMPStrings or UTF8Strings). # MASK:XXXX a literal mask value. # WARNING: ancient versions of Netscape crash on BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. string_mask = utf8only # req_extensions = v3_req # The extensions to add to a certificate request [ req_distinguished_name ] countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) countryName_default = XX countryName_min = 2 countryName_max = 2 stateOrProvinceName = State or Province Name (full name) #stateOrProvinceName_default = Default Province localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) localityName_default = Default City 0.organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) 0.organizationName_default = Default Company Ltd # we can do this but it is not needed normally :-) #1.organizationName = Second Organization Name (eg, company) #1.organizationName_default = World Wide Web Pty Ltd organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) #organizationalUnitName_default = commonName = Common Name (eg, your name or your server\'s hostname) commonName_max = 64 emailAddress = Email Address emailAddress_max = 64 # SET-ex3 = SET extension number 3 [ req_attributes ] challengePassword = A challenge password challengePassword_min = 4 challengePassword_max = 20 unstructuredName = An optional company name [ usr_cert ] # These extensions are added when 'ca' signs a request. # This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software # requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA. basicConstraints=CA:FALSE # Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted # the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing. # This is OK for an SSL server. # nsCertType = server # For an object signing certificate this would be used. # nsCertType = objsign # For normal client use this is typical # nsCertType = client, email # and for everything including object signing: # nsCertType = client, email, objsign # This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate. # keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer # This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname. # Import the email address. # subjectAltName=email:copy # An alternative to produce certificates that aren't # deprecated according to PKIX. # subjectAltName=email:move # Copy subject details # issuerAltName=issuer:copy #nsCaRevocationUrl = http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem #nsBaseUrl #nsRevocationUrl #nsRenewalUrl #nsCaPolicyUrl #nsSslServerName # This is required for TSA certificates. # extendedKeyUsage = critical,timeStamping [ v3_req ] # Extensions to add to a certificate request basicConstraints = CA:FALSE keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment [ v3_ca ] # Extensions for a typical CA # PKIX recommendation. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer # This is what PKIX recommends but some broken software chokes on critical # extensions. #basicConstraints = critical,CA:true # So we do this instead. basicConstraints = CA:true # Key usage: this is typical for a CA certificate. However since it will # prevent it being used as an test self-signed certificate it is best # left out by default. # keyUsage = cRLSign, keyCertSign # Some might want this also # nsCertType = sslCA, emailCA # Include email address in subject alt name: another PKIX recommendation # subjectAltName=email:copy # Copy issuer details # issuerAltName=issuer:copy # DER hex encoding of an extension: beware experts only! # obj=DER:02:03 # Where 'obj' is a standard or added object # You can even override a supported extension: # basicConstraints= critical, DER:30:03:01:01:FF [ crl_ext ] # CRL extensions. # Only issuerAltName and authorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in a CRL. # issuerAltName=issuer:copy authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always [ proxy_cert_ext ] # These extensions should be added when creating a proxy certificate # This goes against PKIX guidelines but some CAs do it and some software # requires this to avoid interpreting an end user certificate as a CA. basicConstraints=CA:FALSE # Here are some examples of the usage of nsCertType. If it is omitted # the certificate can be used for anything *except* object signing. # This is OK for an SSL server. # nsCertType = server # For an object signing certificate this would be used. # nsCertType = objsign # For normal client use this is typical # nsCertType = client, email # and for everything including object signing: # nsCertType = client, email, objsign # This is typical in keyUsage for a client certificate. # keyUsage = nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment # This will be displayed in Netscape's comment listbox. nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Certificate" # PKIX recommendations harmless if included in all certificates. subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer # This stuff is for subjectAltName and issuerAltname. # Import the email address. # subjectAltName=email:copy # An alternative to produce certificates that aren't # deprecated according to PKIX. # subjectAltName=email:move # Copy subject details # issuerAltName=issuer:copy #nsCaRevocationUrl = http://www.domain.dom/ca-crl.pem #nsBaseUrl #nsRevocationUrl #nsRenewalUrl #nsCaPolicyUrl #nsSslServerName # This really needs to be in place for it to be a proxy certificate. proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:3,policy:foo #################################################################### [ tsa ] default_tsa = tsa_config1 # the default TSA section [ tsa_config1 ] # These are used by the TSA reply generation only. dir = ./demoCA # TSA root directory serial = $dir/tsaserial # The current serial number (mandatory) crypto_device = builtin # OpenSSL engine to use for signing signer_cert = $dir/tsacert.pem # The TSA signing certificate # (optional) certs = $dir/cacert.pem # Certificate chain to include in reply # (optional) signer_key = $dir/private/tsakey.pem # The TSA private key (optional) default_policy = tsa_policy1 # Policy if request did not specify it # (optional) other_policies = tsa_policy2, tsa_policy3 # acceptable policies (optional) digests = sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 # Acceptable message digests (mandatory) accuracy = secs:1, millisecs:500, microsecs:100 # (optional) clock_precision_digits = 0 # number of digits after dot. (optional) ordering = yes # Is ordering defined for timestamps? # (optional, default: no) tsa_name = yes # Must the TSA name be included in the reply? # (optional, default: no) ess_cert_id_chain = no # Must the ESS cert id chain be included? # (optional, default: no)
Schlüssel für das Serverzertifikat erzeugen
Nachdem wir nun unsere eigene CA erstellt haben, machen wir uns daran, endlich für unseren Server ein Zertifikat herauszugeben. Hierzu erzeugen wir als erstes einen 4096 Bit langen RSA Schlüssel, den wir mit AES 256 verschlüsselt auf der Platte abgelegt lassen. Da OpenSSL keine leere Passphrase zulässt braucht die Passphrase diesmal nicht sonderlich geheim sein, da wir diese im Anschluss ohnehin sofort wieder entfernen werden.
Die Eingaben sind in der Farbe blau und die Rückmeldungen in der Farbe schwarz gekennzeichnet.
# openssl genrsa -out serverkey.pem -aes256 4096
Generating RSA private key, 4096 bit long modulus .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................++ ........................................................................................................................................................................................++ e is 65537 (0x10001) Enter pass phrase for serverkey.pem: 12qwasyx Verifying - Enter pass phrase for serverkey.pem: 12qwasyx
Wie schon erwähnt, entfernen wir die Passphrase nun wieder, in dem wir bei der Frage Enter pass phrase: einfach die Taste [ENTER] drücken.
# openssl rsa <serverkey.pem >serverkey_2.pem
Enter pass phrase: writing RSA key
Wie schon zuvor schützen wir auch hier den Serverschlüssel über die Dateirechte, nachdem wir diesen umbenannt haben.
# mv serverkey_2.pem serverkey.pem -f
# chmod 400 serverkey.pem
Certificate Signing Request erzeugen
Im folgenden Schritt zu unserem eigenen Zertifikat erzeugen wir einen CSR12), den wir dann in einem weiteren Schritt von unserer eigenen CA signieren lassen werden, oder bei der ausgewählten kommerziellen CA einkippen.
Wichtig: Bei unserem Serverzertifikat ist der Common Name von entscheidender Bedeutung. Hier muss der DNS-Name unseres Apache-WebServers bzw. des vHosts eingetragen werden, unter dem der Webserver später angesprochen wird!
Auch hier sind die Eingaben in der Farbe blau und die Rückmeldungen in der Farbe schwarz gekennzeichnet.
# openssl req -new -key serverkey.pem -out csr.pem -nodes
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated into your certificate request. What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN. There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank For some fields there will be a default value, If you enter '.', the field will be left blank. ----- Country Name (2 letter code) [XX]:DE State or Province Name (full name) []Bayern Locality Name (eg, city) [Default City]:Pliening Organization Name (eg, company) [Default Company Ltd]:nausch.org Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:WEB-Office Common Name (eg, your name or your server's hostname) []:www.sec-mail.guru Email Address []:webmaster@sec-mail.guru Please enter the following 'extra' attributes to be sent with your certificate request A challenge password []: An optional company name []:
Wollen oder müssen wir ein kommerzielles Zertifikat, also von einer in den Browsern und mailclients von Haus aus installierten CAs, nutzen, so lassen wir den CSR der CA zukommen.
# cat csr.pem
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- MIIE5TCCAs0CAQAwgZ8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkRFMQ8wDQYDVQQIDAZCYXllcm4xETAP BgNVBAcMCFBsaWVuaW5nMRMwEQYDVQQKDApuYXVzY2gub3JnMRMwEQYDVQQLDApX RUItT2ZmaWNlMRowGAYDVQQDDBF3d3cuc2VjLW1haWwuZ3VydTEmMCQGCSqGSIb3 DQEJARYXd2VibWFzdGVyQHNlYy1tYWlsLmd1cnUwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA A4ICDwAwggIKAoICAQCvfVsj0y+ZEbP1zlQX6z+vXXvfQXNfTqKnL97F08Yho423 odUteIcaJGqtUpzmhSGmw+0Z7oyVAUiLuZtsChXk//qzkreR8vGjk8QoREgwp3Yb GTxclb2cgYVPaEg17OlwYaNAew5Zxv7GYHISgBsr1MRSdJ6lo6lrGxrbDl3fXYrj TlDZtd9xMIEJ4zh9CuOofNlF0PF2bP/Sa5UDWgpEcNpsBzhzQwFDechvY+LCCYl2 suomiXtk9oojy4+7qqxKJrHB9MV/r3c2WNHSjIbC/SboJtatl458f4ocrHD+TEVf 6urf7KVhoDO121U+5c/yiNOFeILVy3Ih/40Wf6gxxOjdM/mW9hbdyAa8p+lmgbV1 QlBQ6Hq4e5D0712DlHTsNQPVDzZCMNzwwDg0lZrr0WLjnYl2MHRiJnUpjpIaYYVB hGeb9ZTItpqvRBMjmycW1NMFszZNYD0no8fPvxXn7UyIRRs7jP8rSGwBI5srMXfo jLiJ6aaUlE3ajXQI9x02OrYbAN96zgb+pI29/I/fRSF6zd1jvADQToP8+ywawWwI GpbSwFSPfakhMBDNce+8/g3/aZ2o7YM5gl3v0qu2SEYEsBEjHPfmYgv9NFMITAGu 1KXnVMv8jEZQXuAqkXFV708/Iy5mPyeGr+ILztTQxQ3ME2TgfymJPqRASAooSwID AQABoAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggIBAIdzPh2e5A9FMgRh3ZCugZDZ1/XXYJTS 9V1shTO9tpGt1SGv4i5jNKWUaPdQrj8OOW8tV29cBKK74gbZNs6iQMHF68TodeLc nJCDN/FtmZy+nhyue+gVt9DHFxYkQyXv0Q2GDHKv919F1/xKnRluM8/FKTOy7Qbs kvRhW/4aFykXwvn0UcGDQeXchqJ1wY2/y+K1HZcPHavEM7ISYKzyb8Q89RNk6vd9 4UglboPOBZBvofttN++9v7RNkFCbcAJU+JR738oqSuNgjn6w9IQhPmSjyazY6ZF5 UdEGnnCnpR/2xJZ81uG8wMTfVR/qGDfw09Um+2F6wRAY5qXLRtEcvn18QckUyPel HB+K7cR/C1y3NnqyjiEyjc6vl7qTHtOx3AAcbK8CRjdySEQV36Txg8JtqZB33BDB fZZZucmY2bHONtl6q/NnPohEuyuuhC6oIku3+OaHMhOfIy22PICEQKLwSr00w8dJ f4MKgqUytka+ga/ynn8b1ohjAu047jDxpQk1yjqfleFkYgzK6uwb5J5PdyudtoMG JyoCweVtz3BCh0mOVU7x2RDqGNtrOopwqKtbA+3SpDQmXFPLvYO38Hspa0712QJh 9Zos5rF0ta/I+fMbn/nDfyUKfbszKBD/4UzzVl43jz9ZakJBKbzF/z3lXUeMBG6K U56QhSgOCblB -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
Bei Interesse können wir uns unseren CSR auch ansehen, dazu benutzen wir folgenden Befehl:
# openssl req -noout -text -in csr.pem
Certificate Request:
Data:
Version: 0 (0x0)
Subject: C=DE, ST=Bayern, L=Pliening, O=nausch.org, OU=WEB-Office, CN=www.sec-mail.guru/emailAddress=webmaster@sec-mail.guru
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (4096 bit)
Modulus:
00:af:7d:5b:23:d3:2f:99:11:b3:f5:ce:54:17:eb:
3f:af:5d:7b:df:41:73:5f:4e:a2:a7:2f:de:c5:d3:
c6:21:a3:8d:b7:a1:d5:2d:78:87:1a:24:6a:ad:52:
9c:e6:85:21:a6:c3:ed:19:ee:8c:95:01:48:8b:b9:
9b:6c:0a:15:e4:ff:fa:b3:92:b7:91:f2:f1:a3:93:
c4:28:44:48:30:a7:76:1b:19:3c:5c:95:bd:9c:81:
85:4f:68:48:35:ec:e9:70:61:a3:40:7b:0e:59:c6:
fe:c6:60:72:12:80:1b:2b:d4:c4:52:74:9e:a5:a3:
a9:6b:1b:1a:db:0e:5d:df:5d:8a:e3:4e:50:d9:b5:
df:71:30:81:09:e3:38:7d:0a:e3:a8:7c:d9:45:d0:
f1:76:6c:ff:d2:6b:95:03:5a:0a:44:70:da:6c:07:
38:73:43:01:43:79:c8:6f:63:e2:c2:09:89:76:b2:
ea:26:89:7b:64:f6:8a:23:cb:8f:bb:aa:ac:4a:26:
b1:c1:f4:c5:7f:af:77:36:58:d1:d2:8c:86:c2:fd:
26:e8:26:d6:ad:97:8e:7c:7f:8a:1c:ac:70:fe:4c:
45:5f:ea:ea:df:ec:a5:61:a0:33:b5:db:55:3e:e5:
cf:f2:88:d3:85:78:82:d5:cb:72:21:ff:8d:16:7f:
a8:31:c4:e8:dd:33:f9:96:f6:16:dd:c8:06:bc:a7:
e9:66:81:b5:75:42:50:50:e8:7a:b8:7b:90:f4:ef:
5d:83:94:74:ec:35:03:d5:0f:36:42:30:dc:f0:c0:
38:34:95:9a:eb:d1:62:e3:9d:89:76:30:74:62:26:
75:29:8e:92:1a:61:85:41:84:67:9b:f5:94:c8:b6:
9a:af:44:13:23:9b:27:16:d4:d3:05:b3:36:4d:60:
3d:27:a3:c7:cf:bf:15:e7:ed:4c:88:45:1b:3b:8c:
ff:2b:48:6c:01:23:9b:2b:31:77:e8:8c:b8:89:e9:
a6:94:94:4d:da:8d:74:08:f7:1d:36:3a:b6:1b:00:
df:7a:ce:06:fe:a4:8d:bd:fc:8f:df:45:21:7a:cd:
dd:63:bc:00:d0:4e:83:fc:fb:2c:1a:c1:6c:08:1a:
96:d2:c0:54:8f:7d:a9:21:30:10:cd:71:ef:bc:fe:
0d:ff:69:9d:a8:ed:83:39:82:5d:ef:d2:ab:b6:48:
46:04:b0:11:23:1c:f7:e6:62:0b:fd:34:53:08:4c:
01:ae:d4:a5:e7:54:cb:fc:8c:46:50:5e:e0:2a:91:
71:55:ef:4f:3f:23:2e:66:3f:27:86:af:e2:0b:ce:
d4:d0:c5:0d:cc:13:64:e0:7f:29:89:3e:a4:40:48:
0a:28:4b
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
Attributes:
a0:00
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
87:73:3e:1d:9e:e4:0f:45:32:04:61:dd:90:ae:81:90:d9:d7:
f5:d7:60:94:d2:f5:5d:6c:85:33:bd:b6:91:ad:d5:21:af:e2:
2e:63:34:a5:94:68:f7:50:ae:3f:0e:39:6f:2d:57:6f:5c:04:
a2:bb:e2:06:d9:36:ce:a2:40:c1:c5:eb:c4:e8:75:e2:dc:9c:
90:83:37:f1:6d:99:9c:be:9e:1c:ae:7b:e8:15:b7:d0:c7:17:
16:24:43:25:ef:d1:0d:86:0c:72:af:f7:5f:45:d7:fc:4a:9d:
19:6e:33:cf:c5:29:33:b2:ed:06:ec:92:f4:61:5b:fe:1a:17:
29:17:c2:f9:f4:51:c1:83:41:e5:dc:86:a2:75:c1:8d:bf:cb:
e2:b5:1d:97:0f:1d:ab:c4:33:b2:12:60:ac:f2:6f:c4:3c:f5:
13:64:ea:f7:7d:e1:48:25:6e:83:ce:05:90:6f:a1:fb:6d:37:
ef:bd:bf:b4:4d:90:50:9b:70:02:54:f8:94:7b:df:ca:2a:4a:
e3:60:8e:7e:b0:f4:84:21:3e:64:a3:c9:ac:d8:e9:91:79:51:
d1:06:9e:70:a7:a5:1f:f6:c4:96:7c:d6:e1:bc:c0:c4:df:55:
1f:ea:18:37:f0:d3:d5:26:fb:61:7a:c1:10:18:e6:a5:cb:46:
d1:1c:be:7d:7c:41:c9:14:c8:f7:a5:1c:1f:8a:ed:c4:7f:0b:
5c:b7:36:7a:b2:8e:21:32:8d:ce:af:97:ba:93:1e:d3:b1:dc:
00:1c:6c:af:02:46:37:72:48:44:15:df:a4:f1:83:c2:6d:a9:
90:77:dc:10:c1:7d:96:59:b9:c9:98:d9:b1:ce:36:d9:7a:ab:
f3:67:3e:88:44:bb:2b:ae:84:2e:a8:22:4b:b7:f8:e6:87:32:
13:9f:23:2d:b6:3c:80:84:40:a2:f0:4a:bd:34:c3:c7:49:7f:
83:0a:82:a5:32:b6:46:be:81:af:f2:9e:7f:1b:d6:88:63:02:
ed:38:ee:30:f1:a5:09:35:ca:3a:9f:95:e1:64:62:0c:ca:ea:
ec:1b:e4:9e:4f:77:2b:9d:b6:83:06:27:2a:02:c1:e5:6d:cf:
70:42:87:49:8e:55:4e:f1:d9:10:ea:18:db:6b:3a:8a:70:a8:
ab:5b:03:ed:d2:a4:34:26:5c:53:cb:bd:83:b7:f0:7b:29:6b:
4e:f5:d9:02:61:f5:9a:2c:e6:b1:74:b5:af:c8:f9:f3:1b:9f:
f9:c3:7f:25:0a:7d:bb:33:28:10:ff:e1:4c:f3:56:5e:37:8f:
3f:59:6a:42:41:29:bc:c5:ff:3d:e5:5d:47:8c:04:6e:8a:53:
9e:90:85:28:0e:09:b9:41
eigene CA: CSR beabeiten - Zertifikat erstellen
Kommen wir zum krönenden Abschluss - wir signieren nun das Server-Zertifikat durch unsere CA, oder anders ausgedrückt, wir erstellen das benötigte X.509-Serverzertifikat.
Wie schon bereits bei den anderen Konfigurationsbeispielen, sind auch hier die Eingaben in der Farbe blau und die Rückmeldungen in der Farbe schwarz gekennzeichnet.
# openssl ca -in csr.pem -notext -out servercert.pem
Using configuration from /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
Enter pass phrase for /etc/pki/CA/private/cakey.pem: des-woas-blos-I-und-sundst-koana
Using configuration from /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
Enter pass phrase for /etc/pki/CA/private/cakey.pem:
Check that the request matches the signature
Signature ok
Certificate Details:
Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
Validity
Not Before: Aug 29 21:44:44 2014 GMT
Not After : Aug 28 21:44:44 2016 GMT
Subject:
countryName = DE
stateOrProvinceName = Bayern
organizationName = nausch.org
organizationalUnitName = WEB-Office
commonName = www.sec-mail.guru
emailAddress = webmaster@sec-mail.guru
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
Netscape Comment:
OpenSSL Generated Certificate
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
88:A5:D6:38:7F:2A:1F:27:32:75:C3:3A:AE:0D:40:EE:CB:24:15:FA
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:99:32:8B:E6:2C:6E:B2:95:09:34:96:E5:F4:59:5A:5D:2A:AD:1C:C6
Certificate is to be certified until Aug 28 21:44:44 2016 GMT (730 days)
Sign the certificate? [y/n]:y
1 out of 1 certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]y
Write out database with 1 new entries
Data Base Updated
In unserem Arbeitsverzeichnis finden wir nun auch das Serverzertifikat servercert.pem.
Auch hier können wir uns mit hilfe von openssl das Zertifikat genauer ansehen.
# openssl x509 -noout -text -in servercert.pem
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=DE, ST=Bayern, L=Pliening, O=nausch.org, OU=Zertifizierungsstelle, CN=nausch.org/emailAddress=ca-support@nausch.org
Validity
Not Before: Aug 29 21:44:44 2014 GMT
Not After : Aug 28 21:44:44 2016 GMT
Subject: C=DE, ST=Bayern, O=nausch.org, OU=WEB-Office, CN=www.sec-mail.guru/emailAddress=webmaster@sec-mail.guru
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (4096 bit)
Modulus:
00:af:7d:5b:23:d3:2f:99:11:b3:f5:ce:54:17:eb:
3f:af:5d:7b:df:41:73:5f:4e:a2:a7:2f:de:c5:d3:
c6:21:a3:8d:b7:a1:d5:2d:78:87:1a:24:6a:ad:52:
9c:e6:85:21:a6:c3:ed:19:ee:8c:95:01:48:8b:b9:
9b:6c:0a:15:e4:ff:fa:b3:92:b7:91:f2:f1:a3:93:
c4:28:44:48:30:a7:76:1b:19:3c:5c:95:bd:9c:81:
85:4f:68:48:35:ec:e9:70:61:a3:40:7b:0e:59:c6:
fe:c6:60:72:12:80:1b:2b:d4:c4:52:74:9e:a5:a3:
a9:6b:1b:1a:db:0e:5d:df:5d:8a:e3:4e:50:d9:b5:
df:71:30:81:09:e3:38:7d:0a:e3:a8:7c:d9:45:d0:
f1:76:6c:ff:d2:6b:95:03:5a:0a:44:70:da:6c:07:
38:73:43:01:43:79:c8:6f:63:e2:c2:09:89:76:b2:
ea:26:89:7b:64:f6:8a:23:cb:8f:bb:aa:ac:4a:26:
b1:c1:f4:c5:7f:af:77:36:58:d1:d2:8c:86:c2:fd:
26:e8:26:d6:ad:97:8e:7c:7f:8a:1c:ac:70:fe:4c:
45:5f:ea:ea:df:ec:a5:61:a0:33:b5:db:55:3e:e5:
cf:f2:88:d3:85:78:82:d5:cb:72:21:ff:8d:16:7f:
a8:31:c4:e8:dd:33:f9:96:f6:16:dd:c8:06:bc:a7:
e9:66:81:b5:75:42:50:50:e8:7a:b8:7b:90:f4:ef:
5d:83:94:74:ec:35:03:d5:0f:36:42:30:dc:f0:c0:
38:34:95:9a:eb:d1:62:e3:9d:89:76:30:74:62:26:
75:29:8e:92:1a:61:85:41:84:67:9b:f5:94:c8:b6:
9a:af:44:13:23:9b:27:16:d4:d3:05:b3:36:4d:60:
3d:27:a3:c7:cf:bf:15:e7:ed:4c:88:45:1b:3b:8c:
ff:2b:48:6c:01:23:9b:2b:31:77:e8:8c:b8:89:e9:
a6:94:94:4d:da:8d:74:08:f7:1d:36:3a:b6:1b:00:
df:7a:ce:06:fe:a4:8d:bd:fc:8f:df:45:21:7a:cd:
dd:63:bc:00:d0:4e:83:fc:fb:2c:1a:c1:6c:08:1a:
96:d2:c0:54:8f:7d:a9:21:30:10:cd:71:ef:bc:fe:
0d:ff:69:9d:a8:ed:83:39:82:5d:ef:d2:ab:b6:48:
46:04:b0:11:23:1c:f7:e6:62:0b:fd:34:53:08:4c:
01:ae:d4:a5:e7:54:cb:fc:8c:46:50:5e:e0:2a:91:
71:55:ef:4f:3f:23:2e:66:3f:27:86:af:e2:0b:ce:
d4:d0:c5:0d:cc:13:64:e0:7f:29:89:3e:a4:40:48:
0a:28:4b
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
Netscape Comment:
OpenSSL Generated Certificate
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
88:A5:D6:38:7F:2A:1F:27:32:75:C3:3A:AE:0D:40:EE:CB:24:15:FA
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:99:32:8B:E6:2C:6E:B2:95:09:34:96:E5:F4:59:5A:5D:2A:AD:1C:C6
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
64:ba:d4:09:04:c9:1a:67:68:10:82:c8:fb:e1:9b:f5:67:dc:
dc:8d:40:a8:a5:88:3e:45:31:18:a0:16:1a:f3:e2:c2:8c:64:
2b:e3:0c:f7:77:94:f3:4a:71:50:86:ac:29:b2:77:c5:d1:71:
75:e3:5f:2e:9b:ba:54:a0:68:2a:72:43:1b:91:94:00:85:31:
f3:19:41:80:b5:47:5b:e7:15:5a:1f:81:d4:31:a0:de:1b:15:
47:a9:1a:61:56:25:e2:db:d9:bd:79:74:6f:85:d5:15:f2:e6:
0d:f9:47:55:29:7a:88:8b:75:c7:14:32:f1:8b:09:54:59:fe:
d7:31:8b:1d:44:ff:26:a5:b3:8e:4d:3a:cb:ee:30:04:34:ce:
b1:b2:87:dd:08:68:ef:cc:b7:eb:9b:49:04:b1:e7:95:d6:8a:
16:97:b2:ea:41:55:76:be:9e:b9:cc:c6:47:66:c8:43:e8:da:
e8:ed:22:35:7d:80:91:9d:82:03:d6:a5:fc:07:a6:07:e1:de:
24:6e:fa:57:87:6e:37:43:b0:bd:23:0e:d3:18:0d:3a:9f:c4:
1d:d1:85:81:f5:03:80:47:9d:b8:c1:16:46:d4:69:c5:c9:90:
51:92:96:d1:3e:fd:e3:fb:f2:d0:61:40:8b:22:4b:84:b8:13:
65:ad:e7:05:cd:37:c8:52:8d:5f:e5:82:97:cb:2e:72:45:8b:
2e:6f:66:37:c0:2c:01:2e:78:43:a9:08:20:24:12:8d:ab:89:
9f:41:e7:68:bc:8a:46:96:98:d1:3a:b8:c0:8b:9e:5b:f3:86:
10:ed:a5:b5:e4:94:3b:51:4a:5d:bb:ba:6f:f0:fc:fb:56:d5:
22:52:71:ef:83:f8:2e:48:2d:d2:0e:26:d6:ae:bb:c7:e1:ae:
bd:0d:38:45:64:73:fb:29:87:ed:8d:06:ee:97:1e:f8:67:18:
9a:5f:09:c5:e6:34:18:49:61:25:89:cb:be:5b:6d:ae:89:55:
79:52:0e:dc:09:08:72:b4:6c:2d:76:ec:e3:e8:38:f5:9c:a1:
9b:a6:c8:ce:2b:cf:15:b3:02:14:66:8c:7b:bd:cb:3d:5e:e1:
05:7b:8a:23:bd:9e:d7:b4:98:15:17:3b:76:4d:cf:9a:7c:8d:
86:ef:16:d9:b2:7e:6b:b5:3e:d5:5c:41:19:38:b3:45:ca:03:
37:55:d5:d0:5d:0b:26:8a:de:e3:ae:cc:8c:35:66:bd:89:c6:
b7:c7:a5:10:9d:42:48:df:f0:24:c3:be:22:cc:40:5a:f1:9e:
f1:4a:97:5f:5b:fb:f0:e3:eb:1f:d6:b8:b5:1e:d4:79:91:20:
ce:74:c0:d9:27:8f:d8:9c
Speicherort
Bei der Installation der openssl-libs wurden bereits die Unterordner für das WEB-Server-Zertifikat und der zugehörigen Schlüssel-Datei unter /etc/pki/tls angelegt.
/etc/pki/tls/
├── cert.pem -> /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/pem/tls-ca-bundle.pem
├── certs
│ ├── ca-bundle.crt -> /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/pem/tls-ca-bundle.pem
│ ├── ca-bundle.trust.crt -> /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/openssl/ca-bundle.trust.crt
│ ├── localhost.crt
│ ├── make-dummy-cert
│ ├── Makefile
│ └── renew-dummy-cert
├── misc
│ ├── CA
│ ├── c_hash
│ ├── c_info
│ ├── c_issuer
│ └── c_name
├── openssl.cnf
└── private
└── localhost.key
Anschließend legen wir dort die drei benötigten Dateien ab:
- unseren Serverzertifikat : servercert.pem
# mv servercert.pem /etc/pki/tls/certs/
- unseren Serverschlüssel : serverkey.pem
# mv serverkey.pem /etc/pki/tls/private/
- das CA-Zertifikat : cacert.pem
# cp cacert.pem /etc/pki/tls/certs/
- und schützen diese Dateien mit den Dateirechten 400:
# chmod 400 /etc/pki/tls/private/*.pem # chmod 400 /etc/pki/tls/certs/*.pem
Konfiguration
ssl.conf
Bei der Konfiguration unseres TLS-gesicherten Apache-Webservers benutzen wir nun nicht die (komplette) mitgelieferte Konfigurationsdatei /etc/httpd/conf.d/sssl.conf, sondern verlagern die zum Apache vHost, egal ob name based oder IP based, passende Konfigurationsdatei.
Wir sichern dazu erst einmal die originale Konfigurationsdatei.
# cp -a /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf.orig
Im ersten Schritt werden wir nun bestehende Konfigurationsdatei soweit „ausdünnen und nur den ersten Teil verwenden. Den Abschnitt SSL Virtual Host Context können wir nun entweder komplett löschen oder entsprechend auskommentieren.
# vim /etc/http/conf.d/ssl.conf
- /etc/http/conf.d/ssl.conf
# # When we also provide SSL we have to listen to the # the HTTPS port in addition. # Listen 443 https ## ## SSL Global Context ## ## All SSL configuration in this context applies both to ## the main server and all SSL-enabled virtual hosts. ## # Pass Phrase Dialog: # Configure the pass phrase gathering process. # The filtering dialog program (`builtin' is a internal # terminal dialog) has to provide the pass phrase on stdout. SSLPassPhraseDialog exec:/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-pass-dialog # Inter-Process Session Cache: # Configure the SSL Session Cache: First the mechanism # to use and second the expiring timeout (in seconds). SSLSessionCache shmcb:/run/httpd/sslcache(512000) SSLSessionCacheTimeout 300 # Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG): # Configure one or more sources to seed the PRNG of the # SSL library. The seed data should be of good random quality. # WARNING! On some platforms /dev/random blocks if not enough entropy # is available. This means you then cannot use the /dev/random device # because it would lead to very long connection times (as long as # it requires to make more entropy available). But usually those # platforms additionally provide a /dev/urandom device which doesn't # block. So, if available, use this one instead. Read the mod_ssl User # Manual for more details. SSLRandomSeed startup file:/dev/urandom 256 SSLRandomSeed connect builtin #SSLRandomSeed startup file:/dev/random 512 #SSLRandomSeed connect file:/dev/random 512 #SSLRandomSeed connect file:/dev/urandom 512 # # Use "SSLCryptoDevice" to enable any supported hardware # accelerators. Use "openssl engine -v" to list supported # engine names. NOTE: If you enable an accelerator and the # server does not start, consult the error logs and ensure # your accelerator is functioning properly. # SSLCryptoDevice builtin #SSLCryptoDevice ubsec ## ## SSL Virtual Host Context ## #<VirtualHost _default_:443> # ## General setup for the virtual host, inherited from global configuration ##DocumentRoot "/var/www/html" ##ServerName www.example.com:443 # ## Use separate log files for the SSL virtual host; note that LogLevel ## is not inherited from httpd.conf. #ErrorLog logs/ssl_error_log #TransferLog logs/ssl_access_log #LogLevel warn # ## SSL Engine Switch: ## Enable/Disable SSL for this virtual host. #SSLEngine on # ## SSL Protocol support: ## List the enable protocol levels with which clients will be able to ## connect. Disable SSLv2 access by default: #SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 # ## SSL Cipher Suite: ## List the ciphers that the client is permitted to negotiate. ## See the mod_ssl documentation for a complete list. #SSLCipherSuite HIGH:MEDIUM:!aNULL:!MD5 # ## Speed-optimized SSL Cipher configuration: ## If speed is your main concern (on busy HTTPS servers e.g.), ## you might want to force clients to specific, performance ## optimized ciphers. In this case, prepend those ciphers ## to the SSLCipherSuite list, and enable SSLHonorCipherOrder. ## Caveat: by giving precedence to RC4-SHA and AES128-SHA ## (as in the example below), most connections will no longer ## have perfect forward secrecy - if the server's key is ## compromised, captures of past or future traffic must be ## considered compromised, too. ##SSLCipherSuite RC4-SHA:AES128-SHA:HIGH:MEDIUM:!aNULL:!MD5 ##SSLHonorCipherOrder on # ## Server Certificate: ## Point SSLCertificateFile at a PEM encoded certificate. If ## the certificate is encrypted, then you will be prompted for a ## pass phrase. Note that a kill -HUP will prompt again. A new ## certificate can be generated using the genkey(1) command. #SSLCertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt # ## Server Private Key: ## If the key is not combined with the certificate, use this ## directive to point at the key file. Keep in mind that if ## you've both a RSA and a DSA private key you can configure ## both in parallel (to also allow the use of DSA ciphers, etc.) #SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key # ## Server Certificate Chain: ## Point SSLCertificateChainFile at a file containing the ## concatenation of PEM encoded CA certificates which form the ## certificate chain for the server certificate. Alternatively ## the referenced file can be the same as SSLCertificateFile ## when the CA certificates are directly appended to the server ## certificate for convinience. ##SSLCertificateChainFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/server-chain.crt # ## Certificate Authority (CA): ## Set the CA certificate verification path where to find CA ## certificates for client authentication or alternatively one ## huge file containing all of them (file must be PEM encoded) ##SSLCACertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt # ## Client Authentication (Type): ## Client certificate verification type and depth. Types are ## none, optional, require and optional_no_ca. Depth is a ## number which specifies how deeply to verify the certificate ## issuer chain before deciding the certificate is not valid. ##SSLVerifyClient require ##SSLVerifyDepth 10 # ## Access Control: ## With SSLRequire you can do per-directory access control based ## on arbitrary complex boolean expressions containing server ## variable checks and other lookup directives. The syntax is a ## mixture between C and Perl. See the mod_ssl documentation ## for more details. ##<Location /> ##SSLRequire ( %{SSL_CIPHER} !~ m/^(EXP|NULL)/ \ ## and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O} eq "Snake Oil, Ltd." \ ## and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU} in {"Staff", "CA", "Dev"} \ ## and %{TIME_WDAY} >= 1 and %{TIME_WDAY} <= 5 \ ## and %{TIME_HOUR} >= 8 and %{TIME_HOUR} <= 20 ) \ ## or %{REMOTE_ADDR} =~ m/^192\.76\.162\.[0-9]+$/ ##</Location> # ## SSL Engine Options: ## Set various options for the SSL engine. ## o FakeBasicAuth: ## Translate the client X.509 into a Basic Authorisation. This means that ## the standard Auth/DBMAuth methods can be used for access control. The ## user name is the `one line' version of the client's X.509 certificate. ## Note that no password is obtained from the user. Every entry in the user ## file needs this password: `xxj31ZMTZzkVA'. ## o ExportCertData: ## This exports two additional environment variables: SSL_CLIENT_CERT and ## SSL_SERVER_CERT. These contain the PEM-encoded certificates of the ## server (always existing) and the client (only existing when client ## authentication is used). This can be used to import the certificates ## into CGI scripts. ## o StdEnvVars: ## This exports the standard SSL/TLS related `SSL_*' environment variables. ## Per default this exportation is switched off for performance reasons, ## because the extraction step is an expensive operation and is usually ## useless for serving static content. So one usually enables the ## exportation for CGI and SSI requests only. ## o StrictRequire: ## This denies access when "SSLRequireSSL" or "SSLRequire" applied even ## under a "Satisfy any" situation, i.e. when it applies access is denied ## and no other module can change it. ## o OptRenegotiate: ## This enables optimized SSL connection renegotiation handling when SSL ## directives are used in per-directory context. ##SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth +ExportCertData +StrictRequire #<Files ~ "\.(cgi|shtml|phtml|php3?)$"> # SSLOptions +StdEnvVars #</Files> #<Directory "/var/www/cgi-bin"> # SSLOptions +StdEnvVars #</Directory> # ## SSL Protocol Adjustments: ## The safe and default but still SSL/TLS standard compliant shutdown ## approach is that mod_ssl sends the close notify alert but doesn't wait for ## the close notify alert from client. When you need a different shutdown ## approach you can use one of the following variables: ## o ssl-unclean-shutdown: ## This forces an unclean shutdown when the connection is closed, i.e. no ## SSL close notify alert is send or allowed to received. This violates ## the SSL/TLS standard but is needed for some brain-dead browsers. Use ## this when you receive I/O errors because of the standard approach where ## mod_ssl sends the close notify alert. ## o ssl-accurate-shutdown: ## This forces an accurate shutdown when the connection is closed, i.e. a ## SSL close notify alert is send and mod_ssl waits for the close notify ## alert of the client. This is 100% SSL/TLS standard compliant, but in ## practice often causes hanging connections with brain-dead browsers. Use ## this only for browsers where you know that their SSL implementation ## works correctly. ## Notice: Most problems of broken clients are also related to the HTTP ## keep-alive facility, so you usually additionally want to disable ## keep-alive for those clients, too. Use variable "nokeepalive" for this. ## Similarly, one has to force some clients to use HTTP/1.0 to workaround ## their broken HTTP/1.1 implementation. Use variables "downgrade-1.0" and ## "force-response-1.0" for this. #BrowserMatch "MSIE [2-5]" \ # nokeepalive ssl-unclean-shutdown \ # downgrade-1.0 force-response-1.0 # ## Per-Server Logging: ## The home of a custom SSL log file. Use this when you want a ## compact non-error SSL logfile on a virtual host basis. #CustomLog logs/ssl_request_log \ # "%t %h %{SSL_PROTOCOL}x %{SSL_CIPHER}x \"%r\" %b" # #</VirtualHost>
Die Hauptkonfiguration beschrängt sich demnach auf folgende sieben Zeilen:
# egrep -v '(^.*#|^$)' /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf
Listen 443 https SSLPassPhraseDialog exec:/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-pass-dialog SSLSessionCache shmcb:/run/httpd/sslcache(512000) SSLSessionCacheTimeout 300 SSLRandomSeed startup file:/dev/urandom 256 SSLRandomSeed connect builtin SSLCryptoDevice builtin
vHost.conf
# vim /etc/httpd/conf.d/forum.conf
- /etc/httpd/conf.d/forum.conf
# # Django : 2015-10-30 # vHost hk-forum # # Variablen der Hostvariablen Define vhost hk-forum Define errors_log logs/${vhost}_error.log Define access_log logs/${vhost}_access.log Define ssl_log logs/${vhost}_ssl_request.log <VirtualHost 10.0.0.97:80> ServerAdmin webmaster@nausch.org ServerName ${vhost}.nausch.org RewriteEngine on RewriteCond %{HTTPS} off RewriteRule (.*) https://%{HTTP_HOST}%{REQUEST_URI} # Welche Logdateien sollen beschrieben werden SetEnvIf Remote_Addr "10\.0\.0\.20" dontlog ErrorLog ${errors_log} CustomLog ${access_log} combined env=!dontlog </VirtualHost> <VirtualHost 10.0.0.97:443> ServerAdmin webmaster@nausch.org ServerName ${vhost}.nausch.org ServerPath / # Wer soll Zugriff auf die Webseite(n) bekommen? #<Location /> # Options +FollowSymLinks +Multiviews -Indexes # AllowOverride None # AuthType Basic # AuthName "Fuer den Zugriff auf den Webserver bitte Anmeldedaten eingeben!" # AuthBasicProvider ldap # AuthLDAPUrl ldaps://openldap.dmz.nausch.org:636/ou=People,dc=nausch,dc=org?uid # AuthLDAPBindDN cn=Technischeruser,dc=nausch,dc=org # AuthLDAPBindPassword "M52wFn0r0w95z5bn/\EU64FE!" # AuthLDAPBindAuthoritative on # Require ldap-user accessuser #</Location> # Welcher Inhalt soll angezeigt bzw. auf welchen Server sollen die HTTP-Requests #weitergeleitet werden? DocumentRoot "/srv/www/html/${vhost}/" DirectoryIndex index.php <Directory /srv/www/html/${vhost}/> Options none AllowOverride Limit Require all granted </Directory> <LocationMatch "/(config.inc.php|configs|scripts|tests|users|VIRTUALVACATIONS)/"> Require all denied </LocationMatch> # Welche Logdateien sollen beschrieben werden SetEnvIf Remote_Addr "10\.0\.0\.20" dontlog ErrorLog ${errors_log} CustomLog ${access_log} combined env=!dontlog CustomLog ${ssl_log} "%t %h %{SSL_PROTOCOL}x %{SSL_CIPHER}x \"%r\" %b" # Absicherung der Übertragung mit Hilfe von TLS # Django : 2015-10-04 - TLS-Verschlüsselung mit Hilfe von mod_ssl SSLEngine on # Definition der anzubietenden Protokolle SSLProtocol All -SSLv2 -SSLv3 # Definition der Cipher SSLCipherSuite "AES256+EECDH +AEAD" # Schlüsseldatei, mit der der CSR erstellt wurde SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/pki/tls/private/${vhost}.nausch.org.serverkey.pem # Zertifikatsdatei , die von der CA signiert wurde SSLCertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/${vhost}.nausch.org.certificate.pem # Zertifikatsdatei des bzw. der Intermediate-Zertifikate(s) SSLCertificateChainFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/Intermediate.certificate.pem # Änderung der Cipherorder der Clienets verneinen SSLHonorCipherOrder on # TLS 1.0 Kompremmierung deaktivieren (CRIME attacks) SSLCompression off # Online Certificate Status Protocol stapling zum Prüfen des # Gültigkeitsstatus des Serverzertifikats. SSLUseStapling on SSLStaplingResponderTimeout 5 SSLStaplingReturnResponderErrors off # ist in der ssl.conf # SSLStaplingCache shmcb:/var/run/ocsp(128000) # special stuff ### # HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), bei dem der Server dem Client im HTTP-Header # mitteilt, dass dieser nur noch verschlüsselt mit dem Server kommunizieren soll. Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubdomains; preload" # This header enables the Cross-site scripting (XSS) filter built into most recent # web browsers. It's usually enabled by default anyway, so the role of this header # is to re-enable the filter for this particular website if it was disabled by the # user. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/List_of_useful_HTTP_headers Header set X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" # when serving user-supplied content, include a X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff # header along with the Content-Type: header, to disable content-type sniffing on # some browsers. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/List_of_useful_HTTP_headers # currently suppoorted in IE > 8 # http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ie/archive/2008/09/02/ie8-security-part-vi-beta-2-update.aspx # http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ie/gg622941(v=vs.85).aspx # 'soon' on Firefox https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=471020 Header set X-Content-Type-Options nosniff # config to don't allow the browser to render the page inside an frame or iframe # and avoid clickjacking http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickjacking # if you need to allow [i]frames, you can use SAMEORIGIN or even set an uri with # ALLOW-FROM uri https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/HTTP/X-Frame-Options header set X-Frame-Options DENY # hide server header (apache and php version) Header unset Server # Only allow JavaScript from the same domain to be run. # don't allow inline JavaScript to run. Header set X-Content-Security-Policy "allow 'self';" # Add Secure and HTTP only attributes to cookies Header edit Set-Cookie ^(.*)$ $1;HttpOnly;Secure # prevent Clickjacking Attack #Header always append X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN Header set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self';" </VirtualHost>
# vim /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf
- /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf
# # When we also provide SSL we have to listen to the # the HTTPS port in addition. # Listen 443 https ## ## SSL Global Context ## ## All SSL configuration in this context applies both to ## the main server and all SSL-enabled virtual hosts. ## # Pass Phrase Dialog: # Configure the pass phrase gathering process. # The filtering dialog program (`builtin' is a internal # terminal dialog) has to provide the pass phrase on stdout. SSLPassPhraseDialog exec:/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-pass-dialog # Inter-Process Session Cache: # Configure the SSL Session Cache: First the mechanism # to use and second the expiring timeout (in seconds). SSLSessionCache shmcb:/run/httpd/sslcache(512000) SSLSessionCacheTimeout 300 # Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG): # Configure one or more sources to seed the PRNG of the # SSL library. The seed data should be of good random quality. # WARNING! On some platforms /dev/random blocks if not enough entropy # is available. This means you then cannot use the /dev/random device # because it would lead to very long connection times (as long as # it requires to make more entropy available). But usually those # platforms additionally provide a /dev/urandom device which doesn't # block. So, if available, use this one instead. Read the mod_ssl User # Manual for more details. SSLRandomSeed startup file:/dev/urandom 256 SSLRandomSeed connect builtin #SSLRandomSeed startup file:/dev/random 512 #SSLRandomSeed connect file:/dev/random 512 #SSLRandomSeed connect file:/dev/urandom 512 # # Use "SSLCryptoDevice" to enable any supported hardware # accelerators. Use "openssl engine -v" to list supported # engine names. NOTE: If you enable an accelerator and the # server does not start, consult the error logs and ensure # your accelerator is functioning properly. # SSLCryptoDevice builtin #SSLCryptoDevice ubsec ## ## SSL Virtual Host Context ## <VirtualHost _default_:443> # General setup for the virtual host, inherited from global configuration #DocumentRoot "/var/www/html" #ServerName www.example.com:443 ServerAdmin webmaster@sec-mail.guru ServerName www.sec-mail.guru ServerPath / DocumentRoot "/var/www/default" <Directory "/var/www/default"> Options FollowSymLinks AllowOverride none Order allow,deny Allow from All </Directory> <LocationMatch "/(data|conf|bin|inc)/"> Order allow,deny Deny from all Satisfy All </LocationMatch> DirectoryIndex index.php # Use separate log files for the SSL virtual host; note that LogLevel # is not inherited from httpd.conf. # Django : 2014-08-30 # default: ErrorLog logs/ssl_error_log # TransferLog logs/ssl_access_log ErrorLog logs/default-host_sec-mail.guru_error.log TransferLog logs/default-host_sec-mail.guru_access.log LogLevel warn # SSL Engine Switch: # Enable/Disable SSL for this virtual host. SSLEngine on # SSL Protocol support: # List the enable protocol levels with which clients will be able to # connect. Disable SSLv2 access by default: # Django : 2014-08-30 Nur die beiden folgenden Protokolle SSLv3 und TLSv1 anbieten: # default: SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 SSLProtocol All -SSLv2 -SSLv3 # SSL Cipher Suite: # List the ciphers that the client is permitted to negotiate. # See the mod_ssl documentation for a complete list. # Django : 2014-08-30 # default: SSLCipherSuite HIGH:MEDIUM:!aNULL:!MD5 # Docu : http://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/mod/mod_ssl.html#sslciphersuite SSLCipherSuite EECDH+AES256:DHE+AES256:EECDH+AES:EDH+AES:-SHA1:EECDH+RC4:EDH+RC4:RC4-SHA:AES256-SHA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXP:!LOW:!MD5 # Speed-optimized SSL Cipher configuration: # If speed is your main concern (on busy HTTPS servers e.g.), # you might want to force clients to specific, performance # optimized ciphers. In this case, prepend those ciphers # to the SSLCipherSuite list, and enable SSLHonorCipherOrder. # Caveat: by giving precedence to RC4-SHA and AES128-SHA # (as in the example below), most connections will no longer # have perfect forward secrecy - if the server's key is # compromised, captures of past or future traffic must be # considered compromised, too. #SSLCipherSuite RC4-SHA:AES128-SHA:HIGH:MEDIUM:!aNULL:!MD5 # Django : 2014-8-30 # default: #SSLHonorCipherOrder on SSLHonorCipherOrder on # Server Certificate: # Point SSLCertificateFile at a PEM encoded certificate. If # the certificate is encrypted, then you will be prompted for a # pass phrase. Note that a kill -HUP will prompt again. A new # certificate can be generated using the genkey(1) command. # Django : 2014-08-30 # default: SSLCertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt SSLCertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/servercert.pem # Server Private Key: # If the key is not combined with the certificate, use this # directive to point at the key file. Keep in mind that if # you've both a RSA and a DSA private key you can configure # both in parallel (to also allow the use of DSA ciphers, etc.) # Django : 2014-08-30 # default: SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/pki/tls/private/serverkey.pem # Server Certificate Chain: # Point SSLCertificateChainFile at a file containing the # concatenation of PEM encoded CA certificates which form the # certificate chain for the server certificate. Alternatively # the referenced file can be the same as SSLCertificateFile # when the CA certificates are directly appended to the server # certificate for convinience. #SSLCertificateChainFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/server-chain.crt # Certificate Authority (CA): # Set the CA certificate verification path where to find CA # certificates for client authentication or alternatively one # huge file containing all of them (file must be PEM encoded) #SSLCACertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt # Django : 2014-08-30 # default: unset SSLCACertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/cacert.pem # Client Authentication (Type): # Client certificate verification type and depth. Types are # none, optional, require and optional_no_ca. Depth is a # number which specifies how deeply to verify the certificate # issuer chain before deciding the certificate is not valid. #SSLVerifyClient require #SSLVerifyDepth 10 # Access Control: # With SSLRequire you can do per-directory access control based # on arbitrary complex boolean expressions containing server # variable checks and other lookup directives. The syntax is a # mixture between C and Perl. See the mod_ssl documentation # for more details. #<Location /> #SSLRequire ( %{SSL_CIPHER} !~ m/^(EXP|NULL)/ \ # and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O} eq "Snake Oil, Ltd." \ # and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU} in {"Staff", "CA", "Dev"} \ # and %{TIME_WDAY} >= 1 and %{TIME_WDAY} <= 5 \ # and %{TIME_HOUR} >= 8 and %{TIME_HOUR} <= 20 ) \ # or %{REMOTE_ADDR} =~ m/^192\.76\.162\.[0-9]+$/ #</Location> # SSL Engine Options: # Set various options for the SSL engine. # o FakeBasicAuth: # Translate the client X.509 into a Basic Authorisation. This means that # the standard Auth/DBMAuth methods can be used for access control. The # user name is the `one line' version of the client's X.509 certificate. # Note that no password is obtained from the user. Every entry in the user # file needs this password: `xxj31ZMTZzkVA'. # o ExportCertData: # This exports two additional environment variables: SSL_CLIENT_CERT and # SSL_SERVER_CERT. These contain the PEM-encoded certificates of the # server (always existing) and the client (only existing when client # authentication is used). This can be used to import the certificates # into CGI scripts. # o StdEnvVars: # This exports the standard SSL/TLS related `SSL_*' environment variables. # Per default this exportation is switched off for performance reasons, # because the extraction step is an expensive operation and is usually # useless for serving static content. So one usually enables the # exportation for CGI and SSI requests only. # o StrictRequire: # This denies access when "SSLRequireSSL" or "SSLRequire" applied even # under a "Satisfy any" situation, i.e. when it applies access is denied # and no other module can change it. # o OptRenegotiate: # This enables optimized SSL connection renegotiation handling when SSL # directives are used in per-directory context. #SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth +ExportCertData +StrictRequire <Files ~ "\.(cgi|shtml|phtml|php3?)$"> SSLOptions +StdEnvVars </Files> <Directory "/var/www/cgi-bin"> SSLOptions +StdEnvVars </Directory> # SSL Protocol Adjustments: # The safe and default but still SSL/TLS standard compliant shutdown # approach is that mod_ssl sends the close notify alert but doesn't wait for # the close notify alert from client. When you need a different shutdown # approach you can use one of the following variables: # o ssl-unclean-shutdown: # This forces an unclean shutdown when the connection is closed, i.e. no # SSL close notify alert is send or allowed to received. This violates # the SSL/TLS standard but is needed for some brain-dead browsers. Use # this when you receive I/O errors because of the standard approach where # mod_ssl sends the close notify alert. # o ssl-accurate-shutdown: # This forces an accurate shutdown when the connection is closed, i.e. a # SSL close notify alert is send and mod_ssl waits for the close notify # alert of the client. This is 100% SSL/TLS standard compliant, but in # practice often causes hanging connections with brain-dead browsers. Use # this only for browsers where you know that their SSL implementation # works correctly. # Notice: Most problems of broken clients are also related to the HTTP # keep-alive facility, so you usually additionally want to disable # keep-alive for those clients, too. Use variable "nokeepalive" for this. # Similarly, one has to force some clients to use HTTP/1.0 to workaround # their broken HTTP/1.1 implementation. Use variables "downgrade-1.0" and # "force-response-1.0" for this. BrowserMatch "MSIE [2-5]" \ nokeepalive ssl-unclean-shutdown \ downgrade-1.0 force-response-1.0 # Per-Server Logging: # The home of a custom SSL log file. Use this when you want a # compact non-error SSL logfile on a virtual host basis. CustomLog logs/ssl_request_log \ "%t %h %{SSL_PROTOCOL}x %{SSL_CIPHER}x \"%r\" %b" </VirtualHost>
# systemctl start httpd.service
[Sat Aug 30 15:51:04.835612 2014] [suexec:notice] [pid 2696] AH01232: suEXEC mechanism enabled (wrapper: /usr/sbin/suexec) [Sat Aug 30 15:51:04.877767 2014] [auth_digest:notice] [pid 2696] AH01757: generating secret for digest authentication ... [Sat Aug 30 15:51:04.878617 2014] [lbmethod_heartbeat:notice] [pid 2696] AH02282: No slotmem from mod_heartmonitor [Sat Aug 30 15:51:04.896281 2014] [mpm_prefork:notice] [pid 2696] AH00163: Apache/2.4.6 (CentOS) OpenSSL/1.0.1e-fips PHP/5.4.16 configured -- resuming normal operations [Sat Aug 30 15:51:04.896317 2014] [core:notice] [pid 2696] AH00094: Command line: '/usr/sbin/httpd -D FOREGROUND'
# less /var/log/httpd/default-host_sec-mail.guru_access.log
10.0.0.20 - - [30/Aug/2014:16:17:26 +0200] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 302 - 10.0.0.20 - - [30/Aug/2014:16:17:26 +0200] "GET /doku.php HTTP/1.1" 200 9748 10.0.0.20 - - [30/Aug/2014:16:17:27 +0200] "GET /lib/exe/indexer.php?id=start&1409408246 HTTP/1.1" 200 42
# less /var/log/httpd/ssl_request_log
[30/Aug/2014:16:17:26 +0200] 10.0.0.20 TLSv1 ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA "GET / HTTP/1.1" - [30/Aug/2014:16:17:26 +0200] 10.0.0.20 TLSv1 ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA "GET /doku.php HTTP/1.1" 9748 [30/Aug/2014:16:17:27 +0200] 10.0.0.20 TLSv1 ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA "GET /lib/exe/indexer.php?id=start&1409408246 HTTP/1.1" 42
https://addons.mozilla.org/de/firefox/addon/calomel-ssl-validation/
https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/
HSTS
In der vHost-Definition unseres Apache-vHOST ergänzen wir folgende Zeile Header always set Strict-Transport-Security „max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload“.
# vim /etc/httpd/conf.d/forum.conf
... # HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), bei dem der Server dem Client im # HTTP-Header mitteilt, dass dieser nur noch verschlüsselt mit dem Server # kommunizieren soll. Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload" ...
OCSP Stapling
In der /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf folgende Konfigurationszeile nachtragen SSLStaplingCache „shmcb:/var/run/httpd/stapling_cache(128000)“.
# vim /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf
... # Django : 2015-11-11 # Chache-Definition für Online Certificate Status Protocol stapling SSLStaplingCache "shmcb:/var/run/httpd/stapling_cache(128000)" ...
In der vHost-Definition unseres Apache-vHOST ergänzen wir folgende drei Zeilen.
# vim /etc/httpd/conf.d/forum.conf
...
# Online Certificate Status Protocol stapling zum Prüfen des Gültigkeitsstatus
# des Serverzertifikats.
SSLUseStapling on
SSLStaplingResponderTimeout 5
SSLStaplingReturnResponderErrors off
...
$ openssl s_client -connect forum.nausch.org:443 -servername forum.nausch.org -status < /dev/null
CONNECTED(00000003)
depth=2 C = BE, O = GlobalSign nv-sa, OU = Root CA, CN = GlobalSign Root CA
verify return:1
depth=1 C = BE, O = GlobalSign nv-sa, CN = AlphaSSL CA - SHA256 - G2
verify return:1
depth=0 OU = Domain Control Validated, CN = forum.nausch.org
verify return:1
OCSP response:
======================================
OCSP Response Data:
OCSP Response Status: successful (0x0)
Response Type: Basic OCSP Response
Version: 1 (0x0)
Responder Id: EE5EFFFE85DB26C626FBD3698410AD1D0DD3EF58
Produced At: Nov 29 18:16:05 2016 GMT
Responses:
Certificate ID:
Hash Algorithm: sha1
Issuer Name Hash: 84D56BF8098BD307B766D8E1EBAD6596AA6B6761
Issuer Key Hash: F5CDD53C0850F96A4F3AB797DA5683E669D268F7
Serial Number: 6922D213277B49AC169E77A9
Cert Status: good
This Update: Nov 29 18:16:05 2016 GMT
Next Update: Dec 3 18:16:05 2016 GMT
...
Werden keine OCSP-Response Daten angezeigt, ist dies ein Hinweis, dass die OCSP_Konfiguration nnoch nicht richtig abgeschlossen wurde!
Zum Testen kann man alternativ auch den Test bei Qualys SSL Labs oder Observatory by Mozilla nutzen.
Secure Cookie mit HttpOnly
In der vHost-Definition unseres Apache-vHOST ergänzen wir folgende Zeile Header edit Set-Cookie ^(.*)$ $1;HttpOnly;Secure
.
# vim /etc/httpd/conf.d/forum.conf
... # Add Secure and HTTP only attributes to cookies Header edit Set-Cookie ^(.*)$ $1;HttpOnly;Secure ...
https://tools.geekflare.com/web-tools/http-header-analyzer
| set-cookie: | Forum=rtg65np1t1cvnrg7n30l8mad67; path=/; secure; HttpOnly;HttpOnly;SecureDW7fa065a06cb74b536c124cfbe56ac6d3=deleted; expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT; path=/; secure; httponly;HttpOnly;Secure |
HttpOnly und Secure kennzeichnen die erfolgreiche Änderung!
HPKP
# openssl rsa -pubout -in /etc/pki/tls/private/forum.nausch.org.serverkey.pem \
-outform der | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64
writing RSA key nMiOpb6vUnjCoWCkPkDaG4ND8SNWzFTsQf2ZfruLno0=
pin-sha256=„nMiOpb6vUnjCoWCkPkDaG4ND8SNWzFTsQf2ZfruLno0=“
# openssl rsa -pubout -in /etc/pki/tls/private/forum.nausch.org._BACKUP_serverkey.pem \
-outform der | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64
writing RSA key INhxSQ38nCS6ijaAAyo4xAhAZj9xeL3Xaak+GGiM2fo=
Zum Löschen von outdated bzw. falschen key-hashes beim Firefox zuerst einam den Browser stoppen. Anschließend bearbeiten wir die Einträge in der Datei SiteSecurityServiceState.txt im profile-Pafd unserer Installation.
# vim ~/.mozilla/firefox/[unique-id].default/SiteSecurityServiceState.txt
Nach dem Speichern unserer Änderungen starten wir den Browser neu und können wieder auf die zuvor blockierten Seiten zugreifen.
Tests
Artikel auf golem Mozilla bietet Sicherheitscheck für Websites.
Observatory by Mozilla
Qualys SSl Labs SSL Server Test
SecurityHeaders.io by Scott Helme
django